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Introduction
Equilibrium Problems (in short, EP) are a unified approach to express Optimization
Problems, Variational Inequalities, Nash Equilibrium, Fixed Point and Saddle Point
problems within the very same general mathematical framework. In the last decade they
received an increasing interest mainly because many theoretical and algorithmic results
developed for one of these models can be extended to the others through the unifying
language provided by the common format of EPs. Moreover, they benefit from the vast
number of concrete applications that all the above models embrace. As a result, their
applicative domain ranges from Engineering (e.g., desing of cognitive radio systems)
to Economies (e.g., competition over production and/or distribution) and Computer
Science (e.g., cloud computing), and in general EPs arise in the modelling of competitive
agents systems.
The format of the Equilibrium Problem reads
find x ∈ C s.t. f(x, y) ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ C,
where C ⊆ Rn is a nonempty closed set and f : Rn×Rn → R is an equilibrium bifunction,
i.e. f(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ C.
Several kinds of methods have been proposed to solve (EP): fixed point methods, prox-
imal point methods, regularization methods, Tikhonov-Browder methods and extragra-
dient methods. This thesis focuses on the class of the so-called descent methods.
Descent methods come from Optimization Problems aiming at minimizing a function
f : Rn → R (the reader can refer to Appendix B for further details on Optimization
Problems). Their distinctive feature is that the sequence of points xk ∈ Rn they generate
satisfies f (xk) > f (xk+1). As we will see, (EP) can be reformulated as an Optimization
Problem and then solved using descent methods.
The main complexity of all the techniques mentioned above lies in the solution of inner
Optimization Problems, at least one of which has to be solved at every step. In this
thesis, we propose two algorithms that ammortize the cost of this sub-problem relying
on an error tolerant approach, which, roughly speaking, consists in computing only a
sub-optimal solution of the inner problem instead of a truly optimal one. In this way the
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inner problem solver can end his computation earlier, hopefully enhancing the overall
computational cost. As a consequence, our work deals also with practical methods for
computing such sub-optimal solutions and control their quality.
It is worth to notice that the two algorithms are tightly coupled to two non monotone
descent methods: the Enhanced Basic Algorithm and the Nonlinear Constraint Approx-
imation Algorithm. In fact, the two algorithms could be considered an error tolerant
extension of theirs.
The thesis is organized in four chapters.
In Chapter 1, we formally introduce (EP) and its reformulation as an Optimization
Problem. Moreover, we describe two descent methods: the Basic Algorithm and the
Enhanced Basic Algorithm, which differ mainly for the assumptions upon which are
built. Finally, we show our first error tolerant algorithm and its proof of correctness.
Chapter 2 deals with the case in which (EP) involves nonlinear inequality constraints.
Firstly we present the Nonlinear Constraints Approximation Algorithm, which exploits
the particular structure of the constraints, and then we propose our second error tolerant
algorithm and its proof of correctness.
This second error tolerant algorithm is more complex than the previous one in Chapter
1. In fact, due to the approximation of the constraints, the Nonlinear Constraints
Approximation Algorithm requires to know optimal dual solutions of the inner problem,
which in turn cannot be computed exactly in the error tolerant version. In order to
overcome this issue we introduce a notion of dual approximated solution which is suitable
for our aims. In addition, we develop some methods that can be used to compute jointly
the primal and dual approximated solutions. These methods are the subject of Chapter
3.
In Chapter 3, firstly we give a theoretical insight on the nature of sub-optimal solutions,
then we exploit these results to prove the correctness of two methods. The first is
derived from the Frank-Wolfe algorithm and it reduces to a sequence of linear programs.
The second is derived from the Fiacco and McCormick’s Barrier Method and it reduces
to a single unconstrained nonlinear minimization problem. The main difficulty here
originates from the fact that we need to control the quality of the sub-optimal solution.
Indeed, the error tolerant algorithms non only require an ongoing refinement of the
sub-optimal solutions, but also require to know a priori their quality.
Chapter 4 presents an original application that is used as a test case for comparing
our algorithms. The choosen applicative domain is Cloud Computing. We consider the
point of view of an IaaS provider that sells virtual machines with a certain computational
capacity and communication bandwidth to the users. Clearly, a flow allocation in the
physical provider’s network has to match the communication bandwidth bought by the
users. On the other hand, we suppose that the quantity of bandwidth bought depends
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also on prices the provider sets. In our scenario the provider has already allocated the
virtual machines of his tenant and has a stochastic knowledge of the communication
bandwidth intensity that the users will buy as a function of the transmission price. The
objective of the provider is to choose proper network routing and transmission prices in
order to achieve efficient allocations and high revenues. On the other hand, the users
are interested in accessing the best communication bandwidth at the most convenient
price. The system is modeled as a non cooperative game and the algorithms developed
in the previous chapters are applied to find an equilibrium. Numerical results are shown
at the end of the chapter and they show some improvement of performance with respect
to the corresponding exact algorithm.
The thesis includes also two appendices. In the first we recall some important theo-
rems about point-to-set maps in mathematical programming, while in the second we
summarize the most relevant results about nonlinear optimization.

Chapter 1
Descent Methods for Equilibrium
Problems
1.1 Introduction to the Problem
In what follows we assume C ⊂ Rn to be a nonempty compact convex set and f :
Rn × Rn → R, to be a bifunction such that
− f is continuously differentiable,
− f(x, x) = 0 for any x ∈ C
− f(x, ·) is convex for any x ∈ C.
Definition 1.1 (Equilibrium Problem)
We define the equilibrium problem (EP) as follows:
find x ∈ C s.t. f(x, y) ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ C. (EP)
(EP) is a very general model with an expressivity equivalent to the one of Optimization
Problems and of Variational Inequalities Problems (see [BCPP13] for more details).
Another class of problems, which is relevant for the application we will describe in the
Chapter 4 , is given by the Nash Equilibrium problems. In the next paragraph we
introduce the notion of Game and of Nash Equilibrium, and show how the problem of
finding a Nash Equilibrium can be expressed through (EP).
Applications to Game Theory
Definition 1.2 (Game)
A game G is a triple G = 〈P, {Sp}p∈P , {up}p∈P 〉 where
9
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− P = {1, 2, . . . , N} is the set of players,
− Sp ⊆ Rnp is the set of strategies of player p,
− up :
∏N
j=1 Sj → R is the payoff function of player p.
Usually given a point x ∈∏Np=1 Sp we will denote as xp the vector of the components of
x related to the player p and as x−p the vector of the remaining components of x. With
a little abuse of notation we will use up(xi, x−i) or up(x) equivalently and in general, we
will act as if for any two vectors y, x ∈∏Nj=1 Sj the concatenation of yi and x−i preserve
the original order of the components in the vectors y and x.
The interpretation of the above definition is straightforward: there are N players who
can choose a strategy (xp ∈ Sp is the strategy choosen by player p) which we can imagine
as a trajectory of moves in the game. Once each player has choosen his strategy, the
player p can evaluate how good this scenario x = (s1, s2, . . . , sN ) is for him through his
utility function up. We assume that each player is interested in choosing his strategy in
a way that his cost function is minimized.
A game can be given defining for each player the optimization program that determines
the best response, i.e., the optimal strategy with respect to its payoff function when the
strategies of the other player are fixed. Formally, given s−p ∈
∏
i 6=p Si the best response
of the player p is
min{up(sp, s−p) | sp ∈ Sp}.
A common problem in Game Theory is the determination of the Nash Equilibria (Nash
Equilibrium Problem (NEP)) for a certain Game.
Definition 1.3 (Nash Equilibrium)
Let G be a game. A point x∗ ∈ ∏Np=1 Sp is called Nash Equilibrium for the game G iff
for any player p,
∀y ∈ Sp, up(y, x∗−p) ≥ up(x∗).
We can interpret a Nash Equilibrium as a scenario in which every player isn’t interested
in changing his strategy unilateraly because it would result in an increasing of his payoff
function.
Definition 1.4 (Nikaido-Isoda Bifunction ([NI55]))
Let G be a game. Then, we define the Nikaido-Isoda bifunction NI :
∏N
p=1Rnp ×∏N
p=1Rnp → R as follows
NI(x, y) =
N∑
p=1
up(yp, x−p)− up(x).
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The Nikaido-Isoda bifunction allows us to express the problem of finding a Nash Equi-
librium as an Equilibrium Problem. Indeed, it is easy to see that the solutions of the
following Equilibrium Problem:
find x ∈
N∏
p=1
Sp : NI(x, y) ≥ 0 ∀y ∈
N∏
p=1
Sp,
are Nash Equilibria and viceversa any Nash Equilibrium solves the above problem.
1.1.1 Restating (EP) as an Optimization Problem
In order to design a descent method to solve (EP) we clearly need a function to descend.
In this section we show how (EP) can be transformed in an optimization problem to-
gether with a family of functions suitable to the implementation of descent methods.
Definition 1.5 (Gap Function for (EP))
A function f : Rn → R is called gap function for (EP) iff satisfies:
a) f (x) ≥ 0 for any x ∈ C,
b) f (x∗) = 0 iff x∗ solves (EP).
It is straightforward that a function satisfying the above property can be used to refor-
mulate (EP) as an optimization problem. One well known gap function is the function
ϕ defined below.
Definition 1.6 (ϕ)
We define the function ϕ : Rn → R as
ϕ(x) = −min
y∈C
f(x, y).
Theorem 1.1
ϕ is a gap function for (EP).
Proof. Since 0 = f(x, x) ≥ min {f(x, y) : y ∈ C}, then ϕ(x) ≥ 0 for any x ∈ C, hence
a) holds. Furthermore, if −ϕ(x∗) = min {f(x, y) : ∈ C} = 0, then f(x, y) ≥ 0 for any
y ∈ C and therefore x∗ solves (EP). On the other hand is straightforward that if x∗
solves (EP) then 0 = f(x, x) is the minimum value. Thus, b) holds as well.
As a result of the Theorem 1.1, we could solve (EP) through the optimization problem
min
x∈C
ϕ(x). (1.1)
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Unfortunately, the assumptions we made on f are not strong enough to ensure two
properties which are fundamental in order to develop efficient descent methods. Firstly,
we can’t guarantee the differentiability of ϕ. In fact, exploiting Theorem A.2 with
Ω(x) = C and f = −f we get that the directional derivative at point x ∈ C and
direction d ∈ Rn is
ϕ′(x; d) = max
y∈M(x)
〈∇x − f(x, y), d〉
where M(x) = {y ∈ C| ϕ(x) ≤ −f(x, y)},
In general, this expression is not linear as a function of d.
Secondly, also in the good case when ϕ is differentiable, many optimization methods
ensure only to find a stationary point. Thus, a way to ensure that the stationarity of a
point implies that it is a minimizer would be valuable. Notice that usually this would
be guaranteed by the convexity of the gap function ϕ, but unfortunately in general, ϕ
isn’t convex.
1.1.2 Auxiliary Problem Principle
A possible solution to achieve continuous differentiability is to add a regularizing term
h to the bifunction f in such a way that the solutions of the equilibrium problem do
not change. This approach appears in [Mas03], inspired by the work on Variational
Inequalities of Zhu and Marcotte ([ZM94]) and Fukushima ([Fuk92]).
Assumption 1.1 (Regularizing bifunction h)
We assume h : Rn×Rn → R to be a continuously differentiable bifunction over Rn×Rn
such that for any x ∈ C
− h(x, y) ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ C
− h(x, x) = 0,
− h(x, ·) is strictly convex,
− ∇yh(x, x) = 0.
An example is the bifunction
h(x, y) =
1
2
‖x− y‖2. (1.2)
In general, the whole family of Bregman distances provides bifunctions which are suitable
to play the role of h.
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Definition 1.7 (fα)
Given α > 0, we define the bifunction fα : Rn × Rn → R as
fα(x, y) = f(x, y) + αh(x, y).
Notice that fα inherits all the proprieties of f , in addition fα(x, ·) is strictly convex for
any x ∈ C which is a desirable propriety if we whish to solve the problem miny∈C fα(x, y).
We can introduce definitions as we did for f , defining the Equilibrium Problem and gap
function corresponding to fα.
Definition 1.8 (α- Regularized Equilibrium Problem)
Given α > 0, we define the α regularized equilibrium problem as follows:
find x ∈ C s.t. fα(x, y) ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ C. (α-EP)
Definition 1.9
Given α > 0, x ∈ C we define the optimization problem (Pαx ) as
min
y∈C
fα(x, y). (P
α
x )
Notice that since fα is strictly convex the solution of (P
α
x ) is unique.
Definition 1.10
Given α > 0, we define the functions ϕα : Rn → R and yα : Rn → Rn to be respectively
the changed sign optimum value and the minimizer of (Pαx ), i.e.
ϕα(x) = −min
y∈C
fα(x, y),
yα(x) = arg min
y∈C
fα(x, y).
It is straightforward to check that by Definition 1.5 ϕα is a gap function for (α-EP),
moreover we have that ϕα(x) = −fα(x, yα(x)).
The following Theorem ensures that we can work with fα and ϕα in order to solve (EP)
without loss of generality. In other words, it shows that ϕα is also a gap function for
(EP).
Theorem 1.2 ((EP) and (α-EP) Equivalency [Mas00])
Given any α > 0, and x ∈ C, then x solves (EP) iff x solves (α-(EP)).
Proof. Suppose that α > 0 and that x∗ solves (α-EP), then Definition 1.5 guarantees
ϕα(x) = 0, which implies min{ fα(x, y) : y ∈ C} = 0. Since fα(x, ·) is strictly convex by
construction (sum of a convex and strictly convex function), the unique y that minimizes
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fα(x, ·) has to be x∗ (in fact we have fα(x∗, x∗) = 0). Indeed, because x∗ is optimal, it
is necessarily a stationary point for fα(x
∗, ·):
〈∇yfα(x∗, x∗), z − x∗〉 ≥ 0 ∀z ∈ C.
This equation jointly with the fact that ∇yh(x∗, x∗) = 0 implies that
〈∇yf(x∗, x∗), z − x∗〉 ≥ 0 ∀z ∈ C,
and so x∗ minimizes also f(x, ·). Thus, ϕ(x) = −f(x∗, x∗) = 0 and x∗ solves (EP).
Now, suppose that x∗ solves (EP), then by Theorem 1.1 ϕ(x∗) = 0, but we know that
for any x ∈ C −f(x, y) ≥ −f(x, y) − αh(x, y) because Assumption 1.1 guarantees
h(x, y) ≥ 0. Therefore, ϕ(x) ≥ ϕα(x) ≥ 0, where the last inequality follows from
Definition 1.5, thus ϕ(x∗) = 0 implies ϕα(x∗) = 0, and this concludes the proof.
The following theorems justify the exploitation of the regularizing bifunction h. The
next theorem ensures the continuity of yα and ϕα in the more general case when α is
considered to be a variable.
Theorem 1.3
The functions φ : Rn × int R+ → R and y : Rn × int R+ → Rndefined as
φ(x, α) = min
y∈C
f(x, y) + αh(x, y)
y(x, α) = arg min
y∈C
f(x, y) + αh(x, y)
(1.3)
are continuous over Rn × int R+.
Proof. We can invoke Theorem A.1 with Ω(x) = C and f (x, α, y) = −f(x, y)−αh(x, y)
to obtain that φ is continuous over Rn× int R+. The assumptions on f are met because
of the proprieties (x, α, y) 7→ −f(x, y)−αh(x, y) inherits from f and h (viz. continuity)
and it is easy to see that the constant point-to-set map Ω is continuous and uniformly
compact.
Suppose that y(x, α) is not continuos over Rn× int R+, then there must exists sequences
{xk} and {αk} such that
xk → x∗ ∈ C,
αk → α∗ ∈ int R+,
y(xk, αk)→ y 6= y(x∗, α∗) or {y(xk, αk)} diverges.
(1.4)
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Suppose that the y(xk, αk) → y. Since C is compact y ∈ C. Furthermore by the
continuity of φ and (x, α, y) 7→ −f(x, y)− αh(x, y) we have that
φ(x∗, α∗) = lim
k
−f(xk, y(xk, αk))− αkh(xk, y(xk, αk)) = −f(x∗, y)− α∗h(x∗, y).
This implies that y is a minimizer of −fα∗(x∗, ·) over C but since −fα∗(x∗, ·) is strictly
convex the minimizer has to be unique and thus y = y(x∗, α∗), in contradiction with
(1.4).
Now suppose that {y(xk, αk)} diverges. At least one between lim supk y(xk, αk) and
lim infk y(xk, αk) must be different from y(x
∗, α∗), otherwise we would have that y(xk, αk)→
y(x∗, α∗). Suppose without loss of generality that lim supk y(xk, αk) = y2 6= y(x∗, α∗)
then we have found a sequence converging to a value different from y(x∗, α∗) and we can
repeat the same reasoning done for the previous case.
As a corollary of Theorem 1.3, keeping α fixed we obtain the following result:
Corollary 1.1
yα is continuous over Rn.
Theorem 1.4
Given α > 0, x ∈ C solves (EP) iff x = yα(x)
Proof. Suppose that x∗ ∈ C solves (EP) then by Theorem 1.2 and Definition 1.5 we
have that fα(x
∗, yα(x∗)) = f(x∗, x∗) = 0. Since fα is strictly convex the minimizer must
be unique and therefore yα(x
∗) = x∗. Now suppose that x∗ = yα(x∗), thus ϕα(x∗) = 0
and by Definition 1.5 x∗ solves (α-EP) and thus (EP).
Theorem 1.5
ϕα is continuously differentiable over C with the following gradient at point x:
∇ϕα(x) = −∇xfα(x, yα(x)). (1.5)
Proof. We can invoke Theorem A.2 with Ω(x) = C and f = −fα to obtain that for
any x, d ∈ X, the directional derivative ϕ′α(x; d) exists and
ϕ′α(x; d) = max
y∈M(x)
〈∇x − fα(x, y), d〉
where M(x) = {y ∈ C| ϕα(x) ≤ −fα(x, y)}.
But because fα(x, ·) is strictly convex M(x) = {yα(x)} is a singleton. Thus,
ϕ′α(x; d) = −〈∇xfα(x, yα(x)), d〉.
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The continuity follows from the continuity of ∇xf , ∇xh, which we supposed and from
the continuity of yα, which we proved in Corollary 1.1. Therefore, ϕα is differentiable
and (1.5) holds.
To Summarize, in this sub-section we have shown how we can conveniently switch to
our main problem (EP) to a family of Equilibrium Problems (α-EP) gaining the con-
tinuous differentiability of the gap function. It is still not clear how we can overcome
the second issue (stationarity): at the best of our knowledge, two solutions are possible.
Both of them consists in strenghten the assumptions on f . The difference between the
two solutions lies in the choosen assumption: the first is called strictly ∇-monotonicity,
the second is called c-monotonicity. We will introduce the assumptions and the corre-
sponding algorithms in the following sections.
1.2 Descent Method Under strictly ∇-monotonicity As-
sumption
Definition 1.11
A differentiable bifunction g : Rn × Rn → R is called
− ∇-monotone over C if
〈∇xg(x, y) +∇yg(x, y), y − x〉 ≥ 0, ∀x, y ∈ C;
− strictly ∇-monotone over C if
〈∇xg(x, y) +∇yg(x, y), y − x〉 > 0, ∀x, y ∈ C;
− strongly ∇-monotone over C if there exists τ > 0 such that
〈∇xg(x, y) +∇yg(x, y), y − x〉 ≥ τ‖y − x‖2, ∀x, y ∈ C.
The next theorem suggests a possible descent direction under the assumption that fα
is strictly ∇-monotone. Notice that choosing a regularizing bifunction as defined in Eq.
(1.2) the strict ∇-monotonicity of f is a sufficient and necessary condition to fα to be
strictly ∇-monotone. Indeed, in this case
〈∇xh(x, y) +∇yh(x, y), y − x〉 = 〈x− y, y − x〉+ 〈y − x, y − x〉 = 0.
The next theorem motivates the above assumption and will be heavily exploited in the
algorithm.
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Theorem 1.6 ([Mas03] [BCP09])
Suppose that x ∈ C is not a solution of (EP). If fα is strictly ∇-monotone on C, then
〈∇ϕα(x), yα(x)− x〉 < 0.
Proof. We have that for any x ∈ C:
〈∇ϕα(x), yα(x)− x〉
(Theorem 1.5) =− 〈∇xfα(x, yα(x)), yα(x)− x〉
(strict ∇-monotonicity) <〈∇yfα(x, yα(x)), yα(x)− x〉
≤0,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that yα(x) is the minimizer over C of
fα.
Theorem 1.7 ([BCP09])
Suppose that fα is strictly ∇-monotone. If x ∈ C is a stationary point of ϕα over C,
i.e.
〈∇ϕα(x), y − x〉 ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ C,
then x solves (EP).
Proof. By contraddiction, suppose that x doesn’t solve (EP), then by Theorem 1.6 we
have that
〈∇ϕα(x), yα(x)− x〉 < 0
but this would contradict the assumption of stationarity of x.
Basic Algorithm
The algorithm below (we name Basic Algorithm) is due to Mastroeni ([Mas03]) and have
been designed for strictly ∇-monotone f .
At every iteration k the algorithm maintains an approximated solution for (EP) xk and
compute the next one as xk+1 = xk + tkdk. dk is setted to yα(xk) − xk. Thanks to
Theorem 1.6, we notice that it is a descent direction for ϕα, in the sense that there
must exists a steplength t > 0 such that
ϕα(xk + tdk) < ϕ(xk).
tk is the stepsize choosen by the algorithm, aiming to obtain the maximum decrement
of the function ϕα in the direction dk without exiting from C. In other words, tk =
arg mint∈[0,1] ϕα(xk + tdk).
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Algorithm 1.1: Basic Algorithm
1 . Set k = 0 and choose x0 ∈ C
2 . Compute yk = arg miny∈C fα(xk, y)
3 . Set dk = yk − xk
4 . Compute tk = arg mint∈[0,1] ϕα(xk + tdk)
5 . xk+1 = xk + tkdk
6 . I f ‖xk+1 − xk‖ = 0
then STOP
e l s e Set k = k + 1 and GOTO Step 2 .
Formally, the correctness is stated by the following theorem:
Theorem 1.8 (Theorem 3.2 in [Mas03])
Let fα be a strictly ∇-monotone bifunction, then for any x0 ∈ C, the sequence {xk}
generated by Algorithm 1.1 belongs to the set C and any accumulation point of {xk}
is a solution of (EP).
1.3 Descent Method Under c-monotonicity Assumption
Considerations about ∇-monotonicity
Previous assumptions are not completely satisfactory since many bifunction of interests
are not strictly∇-monotone nor they lead to a gap function ϕα such that all its stationary
points over C are minimizers. As an example1 consider the bifunction f : R × R → R
defined as f(x, y) = x−y together with the set C = [−1, 1]. It is a ∇-monotone function
which is not strictly ∇-monotone. The solution of (EP) is the point x∗ = 1. Choosing
h(x, y) = (x−y)
2
2 as regularizing bifunction, we find out that
yα(x) =

−1 if x ∈ (−∞,−1− α−1),
x+ α−1 if x ∈ [−1− α−1, 1− α−1],
1 if x ∈ (1− α−1,+∞),
and
ϕα(x) =

− (1+x)(αx+α−2)2 if x ∈ (−∞,−1− α−1),
(2α)−1 if x ∈ [−1− α−1, 1− α−1],
(1−x)(αx+2−α)
2 if x ∈ (1− α−1,+∞).
The graph of ϕα is given in Figure 1.1. Notice that that every point in [−1−α−1, 1−α−1]
is a local minimum. Hence if we try to solve (EP) minimizing ϕα and employing an
algorithm that stops when a stationary point is found, choosing a starting point x0 ∈
1This example is taken from [BCP09].
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Figure 1.1
Plot of ϕα over C for α = 2.
[−1−α−1, 1−α−1], the algorithm would stop at the first iteration, failing in finding the
solution of (EP).
c-monotonicity
A possible patch to this problem consists in changing our assumptions and consequently
also the algorithm: instead of strict ∇-monotonicity we suppose c-monotonicity.
Definition 1.12 ([BCP09], [BP14])
A differentiable bifunction g : Rn×Rn → R is called c-monotone if satisfies the following
inequality:
g(x, y) + 〈∇xg(x, y), y − x〉 ≥ 0 ∀x, y ∈ C. (1.6)
Notice that c-monotonicity is nor a stronger nor a weaker assumption than strictly ∇-
monotonicity. In fact, it can be checked (see Example 3.4 in [BP14]) that c-monotonicity
doesn’t imply strict ∇ monotonicity and viceversa strict ∇ monotonicity doesn’t imply
c-monotonicity.
Hence, although we have presented c-monotonicity as a patch to solve some particular
issues it is way more: it virtually enlarges the set of problems we can handle.
Conversely, it can be proven that c-monotonicity is stronger than simple∇-monotonicity.
Theorem 1.9 (Theorem 3.1 in [BCP09])
Let g : Rn × Rn → R be a differentiable bifunction, if g is c-monotone, it is also
∇-monotone.
In the remaining part of this section supposing f to be c-monotone allows us to achieve
properties which are fundamental to design a suitable descent method.
Theorem 1.10 (Theorem 3.3 in [BCP09])
Suppose that f is c-monotone. If x ∈ C is not a solution of (EP) then there exists
α > 0 such that x is not a stationary point for ϕα and yα(x)− x is a descent direction
for any α ∈ (0, α].
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Theorem 1.10 allows to finding a descent direction changing the gap function simply
descreasing parameter α.
The next theorem provides an upper bound on the directional derivative of ϕα in direc-
tion yα − x.
Theorem 1.11 (Theorem 3.4 in [BCP09])
If f is c-monotone and h is ∇-monotone, it holds that
〈∇ϕα(x), yα(x)− x〉 ≤ f(x, yα(x))− α(〈∇xh(x, yα(x)), yα(x)− x〉) ≤ 0
for any α > 0 and x ∈ C.
Enhanced Basic Algorithm
The algorithm below is due to Bigi, Castellani and Pappalardo ([BCP09]). It exploits
the considerations we developed so far in order to obtain a solution of (EP) under c-
monotonicity assumption.
Algorithm 1.2: Enhanced Basic Algorithm
0 . Fix η, γ ∈ (0, 1) , β ∈ (0, η) and a p o s i t i v e sequence δi → 0 .
1 . Choose x0 ∈ C , s e t α0 = δ0 , k = 0 and i = 0 .
2 . I f ϕαk(xk) = 0 STOP.
3 . Compute yk = arg miny∈C fαk(xk, y) and s e t dk = yk − xk .
4 . I f
ϕαk(xk)− αk(h(xk, yk) + 〈∇xh(xk, yk), yk − xk〉) < −ηϕαk(xk) ,
then s e t αk+1 = αk , and tk = γ
m
where m i s the s m a l l e s t nonnegat ive i n t e g e r such that
ϕαk(xk + γ
mdk − ϕαk(xk) < −βγmϕαk(xk)
e l s e s e t i = i+ 1 , αk+1 = δi and tk = 0 .
5 . Set xk+1 = xk + tkdk .
6 . I n c r e a s e k and GOTO 2 .
Formally, the correctness is stated by the following theorem:
Theorem 1.12 (Theorem 3.6 in [BCP09])
If f is c-monotone and h is ∇-monotone, then Algorithm 1.2 stops at a solution of
(EP) after a finite number of steps or it produces a sequence {xk} such that any of its
cluster points solves (EP).
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1.4 Error Tolerant Descent Method Under c-monotonicity
Assumption
In a recent article ([LPS13]) Di Lorenzo, Passacantando and Sciandrone proposed a
descent method for (EP) that converges to a solution of (EP) without computing exact
solutions of the problem (??). In fact their approach relies only on the computation of
the so called ε-approximated solution of (Pαx ) defined as follows:
Definition 1.13 (ε approximated solution of (Pαx ))
Given ε, α > 0 and x ∈ C a point y ∈ Rn it is called ε approximated solution of (Pαx )
if satisfies
i) y ∈ C
ii) fα(x, y)− ε ≤ fα(x, yα(x)) ≡ −ϕα(x).
Notice that condition i) implies that fα(x, y) ≥ fα(x, yα(x)).
The authors suppose that the sequence {εk} of approximation parameters goes to 0
and develop a convergent method under the assumption of strict ∇-monotonicity of f .
Inspired by their work, we have designed an error tolerant algorithm that converges
under the assumption of c-monotonicity of f .
Our tractation is structured as follows: firstly a couple of Lemmas concerning properties
of the gap function for some particular sequence of parameters α and ε are stated. It
follows the algorithm pseudocode and its proof of correctness.
1.4.1 Auxiliary Lemmas
In what follows we will use the symbol yαεx to represent an ε-approximation of (P
α
x ).
Notice that given α and x there could be more then one ε approximated solution of
(Pαx ), instead, since fα(x) is strictly convex the minimizer yα(x) is unique.
In addition in this section we will strengthen our assumption on the bifunction h as
follows:
Assumption 1.2
We assume h : Rn×Rn → R to be a continuously differentiable bifunction over Rn×Rn
such that for any x ∈ C
− h(x, y) ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ C,
− h(x, x) = 0,
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− h(x, ·) is strongly convex,
− ∇yh(x, x) = 0.
Now we are ready to state the first couple of Lemmas on the limit proprieties of fα.
Lemma 1.1
Given the sequences
− {αk} such that αk > 0 for any k,
− {εk}such that εk > 0 for any k, εk → 0,
− {xk} such that xk ∈ C for any k, xk → x∗ ∈ C.
− {ykαεx} sequence of εk approximations of (Pαkxk ), i.e., ykαεx ≡ yαkεkxk for any k,
it holds
a) limk→∞ ‖fαk(xk, ykαεx)− ϕαk(xk)‖ = 0,
b) limk→∞ ‖ykαεx − yαk(xk)‖ = 0
Proof. Consider the difference fαk(xk, y
k
αεx)− ϕαk(xk), by Definition 1.13 it holds
0 ≤ fαk(xk, ykαεx)− ϕαk(xk) ≤ εk.
Since εk → 0, we have
lim
k→∞
fαk(xk, y
k
αεx)− ϕαk(xk) = 0. (1.7)
Thus part a) of the statement is proved. Furthermore, because of the strongly convexity
of fα (see Assumption 1.2), the following chain of inequalities holds:
fαk(xk, y
k
αεx)− ϕαk(xk)
= fαk(xk, y
k
αεx)− fαk(xk, yαk(xk))
≥ 〈∇xfαk(xk, yαk(xk)), ykαεx − yαk(xk)〉+M‖ykαεx − yαk(xk)‖2
≥M‖ykαεx − yαk(xk)‖2 ≥ 0.
Where we have exploited the optimality of yαk(xk). Since by (1.7) the LHS tends to 0,
we have that M‖ykαεx − yαk(xk)‖2 → 0.
Lemma 1.2
Consider sequences {αk}, {εk}, {xk} , and {ykαεx} defined in Lemma 1.1. If αk → 0
and
f(xk, y
k
αεx)− αk〈∇xh(xk, ykαεx), ykαεx − xk〉 > η(f(xk, ykαεx)− εk) ∀k > 0, (1.8)
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for any fixed η ∈ (0, 1), then x∗ solves (EP).
Proof. The condition (1.8) could be restated as:
− αk〈∇xh(xk, ykαεx), ykαεx − xk〉+ ηεk
η − 1 < f(xk, y
k
αεx) ≤ εk ∀k > 0
where the last inequality follows from Definition 1.13 taking into account that ϕα(x) ≥
0 for any x ∈ C. Since ykαεx ∈ C and C is bounded we can take a subsequence k ∈ L for
some infinite L ⊆ N such that ykαεx → y∗αεx. Hence exploiting Lemma 1.1 we can assert
that
lim
k →∞
k ∈ L ⊂ N
− f(xk, ykαεx) = lim
k →∞
k ∈ L ⊂ N
ϕαk(xk).
Thus taking the subsequential limit we obtain
lim
k →∞
k ∈ L ⊂ N
− αk〈∇xh(xk, ykαεx), ykαεx − xk〉+ ηεk
η − 1 ≤ limk →∞
k ∈ L ⊂ N
f(xk, y
k
αεx) ≤ lim
k →∞
k ∈ L ⊂ N
εk
⇔
lim
k →∞
k ∈ L ⊂ N
− αk〈∇xh(xk, ykαεx), ykαεx − xk〉+ ηεk
η − 1 ≤ limk →∞
k ∈ L ⊂ N
− ϕαk(xk) ≤ lim
k →∞
k ∈ L ⊂ N
εk.
Besides, Lemma 1.1 b) guarantees lim
k →∞
k ∈ L ⊂ N
ykαεx = y
∗
αεx ∈ C. Thus, thanks to the
continuity of ∇xh(x, y) it holds that
〈∇xh(xk, ykαεx), ykαεx − xk〉 → 〈∇xh(x∗, y∗αεx), y∗αεx − x∗〉 ∈ R
and therefore lim
k →∞
k ∈ L ⊂ N
− αk〈∇xh(xk, ykαεx), ykαεx − xk〉+ ηεk
η − 1 → 0. Putting this to-
gether with the latter inequality above we get:
0 ≤ lim
k →∞
k ∈ L ⊂ N
− ϕαk(xk) ≤ 0.
To complete the proof, we will show that ϕαk(xk)→ 0 as k →∞ with k ∈ L implies that
x∗ solves (EP). Let’s start exploiting the propriety of −ϕαk(xk) of being a minimum:
f(xk, y) + αkh(xk, y) ≥ −ϕαk(xk) ∀y ∈ C. ∀k ∈ L,
taking the limit as k →∞ with k ∈ L, we obtain
f(x∗, y) ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ C,
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i.e., x∗ solves (EP).
Corollary 1.2
Consider x∗ ∈ C that doesn’t solve (EP), and two positive sequences, {αk}, {εk}, such
that αk → 0, εk → 0, then ∃k∗ such that ∀k > k∗
f(xk, y
k
αεx)− αk〈∇xh(xk, ykαεx), ykαεx − xk〉 ≤ η(f(xk, ykαεx)− εk),
holds for all k ≥ k∗ with any fixed η ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Ab absurdo, suppose
f(xk, y
k
αεx)− αk〈∇xh(xk, ykαεx), ykαεx − xk〉 > η(f(xk, ykαεx)− εk) ∀k.
Applying Lemma 1.2 with xk := x
∗ for all k, we get that x solves (EP).
1.4.2 The Algorithm and its Correctness
The pseudo code of Algorithm 1.3 is given below.
Algorithm 1.3: Error Tolerant Algorithm
0 . Choose x0 ∈ C and p o s i t i v e ( dec r ea s ing ) sequences {σk} : σk → 0 ,
{δk} : δk → 0,
∑∞
k=0 δk <∞ and {εk} : εk < δk .
1 . Set α0 := σ0 , s e t k := 0, i := 0 choose cons tant s γ, η, β ∈ (0, 1), η > β .
2 . Compute ykαεx , εk approximated s o l u t i o n o f (P
αk
xk
) .
3 . Set dk := y
k
αεx − xk .
4 . I f
f(xk, y
k
αεx)− αk〈∇xh(xk, ykαεx), ykαεx − xk〉 ≤ η(f(xk, ykαεx)− εk) ,
5 . Compute the s m a l l e s t non negat ive i n t e g e r s such that
−fαk(xk + γsdk, yαkεk(xk+γsdk)) ≤ −fαk(xk, ykαεx) + βγ2s(f(xk, ykαεx)− εk) + δk ,
s e t tk := γ
2s and αk+1 := αk ,
e l s e
6 . s e t tk := 0 , i := i+ 1 , αk+1 := σi .
7 . Set xk+1 := xk + tkdk and k := k + 1 .
8 . I f fαk(xk, y
k
αεx) ≤ εk STOP e l s e GOTO 2 .
Lemma 1.3
The line search procedure at Step 5 of Algorithm 1.3 is well defined, i.e., it terminates
in a finite number of steps.
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Proof. Assume by contradiction that for all s
−fαk(xk + γsdk, yαkεk(xk+γsdk)) + fαk(xk, ykαεx) > βγ2s(f(xk, ykαεx)− εk) + δk
holds. Since by Definition 1.13 the LHS is less or equal to ϕαk(xk+γ
sdk)−ϕαk(xk)+εk,
it also holds
ϕαk(xk + γ
sdk)− ϕαk(xk) + εk > βγ2s(f(xk, ykαεx)− εk) + δk.
Taking εk to the RHS, and dividing by γ
s we obtain
ϕαk(xk + γ
sdk)− ϕαk(xk)
γs
> βγs(f(xk, y
k
αεx)− εk) +
δk − εk
γs
.
For sufficiently large s, we have
δk − εk
γs
≥ 〈∇xϕαk(xk), dk〉+ 1,
Thus for those s we have that
ϕαk(xk + γ
sdk)− ϕαk(xk)
γs
≥ βγs(f(xk, ykαεx)− εk) + 〈∇xϕαk(xk), dk〉+ 1.
Taking the lims→∞ we get to the contradiction
〈∇xϕαk(xk), dk〉 ≥ 〈∇xϕαk(xk), dk〉+ 1.
Lemma 1.4
Let f be c-monotone. Consider a subsequence indexed by kr (and his induced natural
numbers subset R), such that xkr → x∗ and αkr → σ 6= 0 and suppose that
f(xk, y
k
αεx)− αk〈∇xh(xk, ykαεx), ykαεx − xk〉 ≤ η(f(xk, ykαεx)− εk)
holds. Then
〈∇xϕσ(x∗), yσ(x∗)− x∗〉 ≤ ηf(x∗, yσ(x∗))
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Proof. For all k ∈ R the following chain of inequalities holds:
〈∇xϕαk(xk), yαk(xk)− xk〉
≤ f(xk, yαk(xk))− αk〈∇xh(xk, yαk(xk)), yαk(xk)− xk〉
≤ f(xk, ykαεx) + αk(h(xk, ykαεx)− h(xk, yαk(xk)))− αk〈∇xh(xk, yαk(xk)), yαk(xk)− xk〉
≤ η(f(xk, ykαεx)− εk) + αk(h(xk, ykαεx)− h(xk, yαk(xk)))
+ αk(〈∇xh(xk, ykαεx), ykαεx − xk〉 − 〈∇xh(xk, yαk(xk)), yαk(xk)− xk〉)
(1.9)
Where the first inequality is Theorem 1.11, the second is implied by Definition 1.13
and the third is provided by the assumption. We conclude the proof taking the limit as
k →∞ with k ∈ R of (1.9). In fact, for Theorem 1.3 we have
yαk(xk)→ yσ(x∗). (1.10)
In addition, Lemma 1.1 guarantees lim
k →∞
k ∈ R ⊂ N
‖ykαεx−yαk(xk)‖ = 0. Hence, ykαεx → yσ(x∗)
and we obtain
αk(h(xk, y
k
αεx)− h(xk, yαk(xk)))
+ αk(〈∇xh(xk, ykαεx), ykαεx − xk〉 − 〈∇xh(xk, yαk(xk)), yαk(xk)− xk〉)→ 0
η(f(xk, y
k
αεx)− εk)→ ηf(x∗, yσ(x∗)).
Lemma 1.5
Consider the sequence of {αk} generated by the algorithm. If αk → σ 6= 0, then
lim
k→∞
|t2k(f(xk, ykαεx)− εk)| = 0
Proof. The condition at Step 4 can be not met at most a finite number of times (oth-
erwise αk → 0). Therefore, there must exist k such that for all k ≥ k αk = σ. The
definition of tk (Step 5) guarantees
fαk(xk + tkdk, yαkεk(xk+tkdk)) ≤ −fαk(xk, ykαεx) + βt2k(f(xk, ykαεx)− k) + δk ∀k ≥ k.
Thus, the definition of ε-approximation leads to the following equation:
ϕαk(xk+1)− ϕαk(xk)− εk ≤− fαk(xk + tkdk, yαkεk(xk+tkdk)) + fαk(xk, ykαεx)
≤βt2k(f(xk, ykαεx)− k) + δk ∀k ≥ k.
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Summing up these inequalities from k to k we get
k∑
i=k
ϕσ(xi+1)− ϕσ(xi)− εi ≤
k∑
i=k
βt2i (f(xi, y
i
αεx)− i) + δi.
Since
k∑
i=k
ϕσ(xi+1)− ϕσ(xi) = ϕσ(xk)− ϕσ(xk), (1.11)
taking δi to the LHS and multiplying by −1 we obtain
−ϕσ(xk) + ϕσ(xk) +
k∑
i=k
(εi + δi) ≥
k∑
i=k
−βt2i (f(xi, yiαεx)− i).
Since εi+δi ≤ 2δi, ϕσ(xk) ≤ 0 and (by definition of the approximation) f(xi, yiαεx)−i ≤
0, the above inequality implies that
ϕσ(xk) + 2
k∑
i=k
δi ≥
k∑
i=k
β|t2i (f(xi, yiαεx)− i)|.
By assumption, the series
∑∞
i=k
δi is convergent, hence also the series∑∞
i=k
β|t2i (f(xi, yiαεx)− i) is convergent, which implies limk→∞ β|t2k(f(xk, ykαεx)− εk)| =
0.
Lemma 1.6
Let f be c-monotone. If αk → σ 6= 0 and x∗ is a cluster point of {xk}, then x∗ solves
(EP).
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that the subsequence xkr satisfy xkr → x∗.
Lemma 1.5 guarantees
lim
r→∞β|t
2
kr(f(xkr , y
kr
αεx)− εkr)| = 0.
Two cases may occour, f(xkr , y
kr
αεx)− εkr → 0 or tkr → 0.
1. If f(xkr , y
kr
αεx)− εkr → 0 then from Definition 1.13 we have
lim
r→∞ fαkr (xkr , y
kr
αεx) ≥ limr→∞−ϕαkr (xkr) ≥ limr→∞ fαkr (xkr , y
kr
αεx)− εkr
Therefore εkr → 0 and f(xkr , ykrαεx)→ 0 guarantee
lim
r→∞−ϕαkr (xkr) = limr→∞ fαkr (xkr , y
kr
αεx) ≥ limr→∞ f(xkr , y
kr
αεx) = 0,
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and thus, limr→∞−ϕσ(xkr) = 0. Thanks to the non negativity of ϕσ. Since we
have found a pair (x∗, yσ(x∗)) that minimizes the gap function, Theorem 1.1
guarantees that x∗ solves (EP).
2. Now suppose that tkr → 0. Let R be the infinite subset of N induced by {kr}. The
line search at Step 5,ensures that
−fαk(xk +
tk
γ
dk, yαkεk(xk+
tk
γ
dk)
) > −fαk(xk, ykαεx) + β(
tk
γ
)2(f(xk, y
k
αεx)− εk) + δk,
is valid for all k ∈ R. Furthermore, (Definition 1.13) guarantees ϕαk(xk +
tk
γ dk) ≥ −fαk(xk +
tk
γ
dk, yαkεk(xk+
tk
γ
dk)
)
−fαk(xk, ykαεx) ≥ ϕαk(xk)− εk
for all k ∈ R. Hence, for all k ∈ R, it holds
ϕαk(xk+
tk
γ
dk)−ϕαk(xk) > β(
tk
γ
)2(f(xk, y
k
αεx)−εk)+δk−εk ≥ +β(
tk
γ
)2(f(xk, y
k
αεx)−εk).
By the mean value theorem there exists θk ∈ (0, 1) such that
〈∇ϕαk(xk + θk
tk
γ
dk), dk〉 ≥ β tk
γ
(f(xk, y
k
αεx)− εk) ∀k ∈ R.
Taking the limit as k →∞ we obtain
〈∇ϕσ(x∗), d∗〉 ≥ 0.
Where d∗ := yσ(x∗)− x∗. Besides, Lemma 1.4 guarantees
〈∇ϕσ(x∗), d∗〉 ≤ ηf(x∗, yσ(x∗)).
Putting the two inequalities together, we get
ηf(x∗, yσ(x∗)) ≥ 0,
that implies that −ϕσ(x∗) ≥ 0. Therefore, as in the previous case, x∗ solves (EP).
Theorem 1.13 (Correctness of Algorithm 1.3)
Let f be c-monotone. Let x∗ be a cluster point of the sequence {xk} generated by
Algorithm 1.3, then x∗ solves (EP).
Chapter 1 Descent Methods for Equilibrium Problems 29
Proof. Firstly notice that, the existence of a cluster point is guaranteed by the compact-
ness of C. Let {kr} be a subsequence such that xkr → x∗. We distinguish two cases:
αk → 0, and αk → σ 6= 0 (indeed, there are no other possibility for {αk}).
1. Suppose αk → 0. Then, we can choose an appropriate subsequence S of {kr} such
that
f(xk, y
k
αεx)− αk〈∇xh(xk, ykαεx), ykαεx − xk〉 > η(f(xk, ykαεx)− εk) ∀kr ∈ S,
This could be for example the subsequence of αkr obtained restricting to different
values of αkr . Now we are in condition to apply Lemma 1.2 and prove that x
∗
solves (EP).
2. Suppose that αk → σ 6= 0, then the thesis follows from Lemma 1.6.

Chapter 2
Handling Nonlinear Constraints
This Chapter is devoted to the particular case when the set C is described not only
by linear constraints but also by nonlinear inequalities. Since solving the auxiliary
problem (Pαx ) could become a cumbersome task in presence of non linear inequalities,
approximation techniques have been adopted in literature to contain the algorithmic
cost.
Firstly, we show a descent method that approximates the nonlinear constraints with
their first order Taylor approximation in order to solve more efficiently the auxiliary
problem. Then, we develop an error tolerant version of the method and, in the next
chapter, discuss possible ways to compute solution of the auxiliary problem.
2.1 Nonlinear Constraints Approximation Algorithm
Throughout this Chapter we will make further assumptions on C.
Assumption 2.1
We suppose C to be the intersection of a bounded polyhedron D and a convex set given
through convex inequalities, namely C = D ∩ C˜ with
D = {y ∈ Rn : 〈aj , v〉 ≤ bj , j = 1, . . . , r1, 〈aj , v〉 = bj , j = r + 1, . . . , r}
for some aj ∈ Rn and bj ∈ R
C˜ = {y ∈ Rn : ci(y) ≤ 0 i = 1, . . . ,m}
where ci : Rn → R are twice continuously differentiable (nonlinear) convex functions.
Furthermore we assume that the vectors aj with j = 1, . . . , r1 are linearly independent
and that there exists yˆ ∈ D such that 〈aj , yˆ〉 < bj for j = 1, . . . , r1 and ci(yˆ) < 0 for i =
1, . . . ,m.
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The method we describe has been proposed by Bigi and Passacantando ([BP12]) and
is built upon a new gap function ψ : Rn → R. While computing the gap function
ϕ at a point x implicitly involves an Optimization Problem over the set C defined
in Assumption 2.1, computation of ψ(x) involves an Optimization Problem over the
polyhedron P (x), defined as follows:
Definition 2.1 (Polyhedron P (x))
Given (EP) and a point x ∈ Rn we define the polyhedron P (x) as:
P (x) = {y ∈ D : ci(x) + 〈∇xci(x), y − x〉 ≤ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m},
where ci and D are the ones defined in Assumption 2.1.
As a consequence of the simpler structure of the feasible set, the computation of ψ(x)
should be less expensive than computing ϕ(x).
Before step deeply into the method, we want to point out some properties of P (x) that
will be used extensively throughout this Chapter.
Proposition 2.1 ([BP12])
Given x ∈ Rn, it holds
a) C ⊆ P (x) ⊆ D;
b) x ∈ C ⇔ x ∈ P (x).
Proof. a) By Definition 2.1 we have that P (x) ⊆ D. On the other hand the convexity
of ci guarantees
ci(x) ≥ ci(x0) + 〈∇ci(x0), x0 − x〉, (2.1)
for any x0, x ∈ Rn. thus, if x ∈ C, we have that 0 ≥ ci(x) and hence x ∈ P (x).
b) Consider a point x ∈ D by Definition 2.1 we have that x ∈ P (x) iff ci(x) ≤ 0 for
any i.
We still not have given a clear definition of the function ψ. Formally, given x ∈ D we
define the problem Px as
min
y∈P (x)
f(x, y), (Px)
and define the function ψ : D → R as the changed sign optimal value of Px for given x.
In order to handle a differentiable function we can exploit the auxiliary problem principle
defining the problem (Pαx ) and the function ψα. Notice that in this way we gain also
the strictly convexity of the objective function.
Chapter 2 Handling Nonlinear Constraints 33
Definition 2.2
Given α > 0, x ∈ C we define the optimization problem (Pαx ) as
find να(x) = arg min
y∈P (x)
fα(x, y) (Pαx )
Notice that since fα is strictly convex the solution of (Pαx ) is unique.
Definition 2.3
Given α > 0, we define the functions ψα : Rn → R and να : Rn → Rn to be respectively
the changed sign optimum value and the minimizer of (Pαx ), i.e.
ψα(x) = − min
y∈P (x)
fα(x, y),
να(x) = arg min
y∈P (x)
fα(x, y).
Functions ψα and να are clearly the counterparts of ϕα and yα.
We will see in few pages that we can deal with ψα or να as we did previously with
the gap function ϕα or yα, i.e. they allow us to reformulate (EP) as an Optimization
Problem.
Under Assumption 2.1, the map x 7→ να(x) is single valued (remember that fα(x, ·) is
strictly convex and thus the solution of min{fα(x, y) : y ∈ P (x)} is unique), furthermore
it allows a fixed point reformulation of (EP) as stated by the following theorem:
Lemma 2.1 ([BP12])
Given any α > 0, x∗ solves (EP) iff να(x∗) = x∗.
Proof. Suppose that x∗ solves (EP), then for Theorem 1.2 it also solves (α-EP).
and therefore thanks to Theorem 1.1 it minimizes fα(x
∗, ·) over C.
Hence, there exist Lagrange multiplier vectors λ∗ ∈ Rm+ , and µ∗ ∈ Rr such that
µ∗1, µ∗2, . . . , µ∗r1 ≥ 0 and
∇yfα(x∗, x∗) +
∑m
i=0 λ
∗
i∇ci(x∗) +
∑r
j=0 µ
∗
jaj = 0
λ∗i ci(x
∗) = 0 i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
µ∗j (〈aj , x∗〉 − bj) = 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , r
ci(x
∗) ≤ 0 i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
〈aj , x∗〉 − bj ≤ 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , r1
〈aj , x∗〉 − bj = 0 j = r1 + 1, 2, . . . , r.
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Defining gi(y) = ci(x
∗) + 〈∇ci(x∗), y − x〉, then we have gi(x∗) = ci(x∗) and we can
rewrite the above conditions in the following way:
∇yfα(x∗, x∗) +
∑m
i=0 λ
∗
i∇gi(x∗) +
∑r
j=0 µ
∗
jaj = 0
λ∗i gi(x
∗) = 0 i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
µ∗j (〈aj , x∗〉 − bj) = 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , r
gi(x
∗) ≤ 0 i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
〈aj , x∗〉 − bj ≤ 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , r1
〈aj , x∗〉 − bj = 0 j = r1 + 1, 2, . . . , r,
which are the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the problem of minimizing fα(x
∗, ·)
over P (x∗). Since this is a strictly convex problem and both x∗ and να(x∗) solve it we
have that να(x
∗) = x∗.
Now suppose that να(x
∗) = x∗, therefore x∗ ∈ C because x∗ = να(x∗) ∈ P (x∗). Since
να(x
∗) minimizes fα(x∗, ·) over C, the necessary and sufficient conditions read
〈∇yf(x∗, x∗), z − x∗〉 ≥ 0 ∀z ∈ P (x∗),
taking into account that ∇yh(x, x) = 0 for any x ∈ C. Since C ⊆ P (x∗), we also have
〈∇yf(x∗, x∗), z − x∗〉 ≥ 0 ∀z ∈ C.
Hence, x∗ is a minimizer of f(x∗, ·) over C and f(x∗, x∗) = 0. Thus, x∗ solves (EP).
Lemma 2.2 ([BP12])
Given α > 0, the function ψα is a gap function for (α EP), i.e.,
(a) ψα(x) ≥ 0 for any x ∈ C,
(b) x∗ solves (EP) iff ψα(x∗) = 0 and x∗ ∈ C.
Proof. (a) If x ∈ C, then optimality of να(x) guarantees
−ψα(x) = fα(x, να(x)) ≤ fα(x, x) = 0.
(b) If x∗ solves (EP), then x∗ ∈ C and by Lemma 2.1 να(x∗) = x∗. Thus ψα(x∗) = 0.
On the other hand, suppose that ψα(x
∗) = fα(x∗, x∗) = 0 and x∗ ∈ C. Since fα(x, ·)
is strictly convex να(x
∗) = x∗ is the only minimizer of that function. Therefore we can
apply again Lemma 2.1 to conclude the proof.
Lemma 2.3 ([BP12])
For any α > 0, the map να is continuous on Rn.
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Lemma 2.4 ([BP12])
For any α > 0, ψα is locally Lipschitz continuous on Rn.
Definition 2.4 (Clarke Generalized Directional Derivative [Cla87])
Let f : Rn → R be a locally Lipschitz continuous function, then we define the Clarke
generalized directional derivative in direction d ∈ Rn at point x ∈ Rnas:
f ◦(x; d) = lim sup
(z,t)→(x,0)
f (z + td)− f (z)
t
In a similar way we can define the generalized gradient.
Definition 2.5 (Generalized Gradient [Cla87])
Let f : Rn → R be a locally Lipschitz continuous function, then given x ∈ Rn, we define
the generalized gradient set ∂◦f (x) of f at x as
∂◦f (x) = {ξ ∈ Rn | f ◦(x; v) ≥ 〈ξ, v〉 v ∈ Rn}.
an element of ∂◦f (x) is called generalized gradient of f at x.
In our case the generalized directional derivative plays the role of the directional deriva-
tive in order to validate a descent direction: if it is negative, we have found a descent
direction. The main reason to exploit the generalized directional derivative is the ex-
ploitation of the mean value theorem:
f (x+ d)− f (x) = 〈ξ, d〉
where ξ is a generalized gradient of f at a point in the line between x and d. Notice
that this property is not guaranteed by the directional derivative in the case of non
differentiable functions.
The following theorem (which is the counterpart of Theorem 1.11) is fundamental: it
provides an upper bound on the generalized directional derivative ψ◦α(x; να(x)−x), thus
allowing to avoiding its direct computation.
Theorem 2.1 ([BP12])
Given α > 0, the inequality
ψ◦α(x, να(x)− x) ≤ −〈∇xfα(x, να(x)), να(x)− x〉,
holds for any x ∈ D.
When we substitute C with P (x), implicitely we loose the guarantee to remain inside
C while moving along the direction να(x)−x. In fact, να(x) could belong to D\C while
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exploiting the direction yα(x)− x with proper stepsize, we were sure to never get out of
C (assuming x ∈ C).
This issue have been tackled in [BP12] exploiting penalization techniques: instead of
minimizing the gap function ψα, they minimize the function defined as follows:
Definition 2.6
Given α, % > 0, we define the function Ψ%α : Rn → R
Ψ%α(x) = ψα(x) +
1
%
‖c+(x)‖, (2.2)
and c+(x) = (c+1 (x), c
+
2 (x), . . . , c
+
m(x)) with
c+i (x) =
0 if ci(x) < 0ci(x) otherwise. (2.3)
It’s immediate that for all the points outside C, the additive term 1%‖c+(x)‖ act as a
penalization increasing the value of the objective function, instead for all points belong-
ing to C, Ψ%α is equal to ψα. % is employed as the penalization’s tuner: reducing % the
penalization increases and viceversa increasing it the penalization decreses.
Exploiting penalization, we obtain a gap function over the whole set D as stated by the
following theorem:
Theorem 2.2 ([BP12])
Given α > 0, there exist % > 0 such that
a) Ψ%α(x) ≥ 0 for any x ∈ D,
b) x∗ solves (EP) iff Ψ%α(x∗) = 0,
where α ∈ [0, α] and % ∈ (0, %).
The next theorem involves some inequality that will be very useful in the designing of a
descent method.
Lemma 2.5 (Lemma 4 and Theorem 4 in [BP12])
Suppose that f : Rn × Rn → R is c-monotone, and let Λα(x) be the set of Lagrangian
multipliers associated to να(x), then it holds that:
(i) Ψα◦% (x; να(x)− x) ≤ −Ψα% (x)− α[h(x, να(x)) + 〈∇xh(x, να(x)), να(x)− x〉],
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(ii) If x ∈ D \ C and (λ, µ) ∈ Λα(x), then Ψα◦% (x; να(x) − x) < 0 for any % such that
1
% > ‖(λ+)‖, where
λ+i =
λi if ci(x) > 00 else.
(iii) If x ∈ C does not solve (EP) and η ∈ (0, 1), then
Ψ%α(x)− αk(h(x, να(x)) + 〈∇xh(x, να), να(x)− x〉) ≤ −ηΨα(x)
holds for any ε > 0, and any sufficiently small α > 0.
The first statement is the counterpart of Theorem 2.1 and provides a way to check
whether or not the direction να(x)−x is a descent one. The second and third statement
suggests a condition on the penalization parameter % and the Lagrangian multipliers
that will be used to ensure the correctness of the algorithm.
Now we are ready to give the algorithm pseudocode (see the listing Algorithm 2.1)
and state its correcteness.
Algorithm 2.1: Nonlinear Constraints Approximation Algorithm
0 . Fix η, γ, δ ∈ (0, 1) , β ∈ (0, η) and p o s i t i v e sequence αk, %k ↓ 0 ,
choose x0 ∈ D , and s e t k = 1 .
1 . Set z0 = xk−1 and j = 0 .
2 . Compute νj = arg miny∈P (zj) fαk(zj , y) and λj ∈ Rm any Lagrange
m u l t i p l i e r vec to r cor re spond ing to the l i n e a r i z e d
c o n s t r a i n t s .
3 . Set dj = νj − zj , i f dj = 0 STOP.
4 . I f the f o l l o w i n g r e l a t i o n s hold :
a ) Ψ%kαk(zj) > 0
b) 1%k ≥ ‖λ
+
k ‖+ δ
c ) Ψ%kαk(zj)− αk(h(zj , νj) + 〈∇xh(zj , νj), νj − zj〉) < −ηΨ%kαk(zj)
then compute the s m a l l e s t non negat ive i n t e g e r s
such that
Ψ%kαk(zj + γ
sdj)−Ψ%kαk(zj) ≤ −βγ2s‖dj‖ ,
s e t tj = γ
s , zj+1 = zj + tjdj , j = j + 1 and GOTO Step 2 ,
e l s e s e t xk = zj , k = k + 1 and GOTO Step 1 .
Theorem 2.3 (Correctness of Algorithm 2.1 [BP12])
If f is c-monotone, then either the algorithm stops at a solution of (EP) after a fi-
nite number of iterations or it produces either an infinite sequence {xk} or an infinite
sequence {zj} such that any of its cluster points solves (EP).
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2.2 Error Tolerant Extension
As we did before with Algorithm 1.2, now we are going to develop an Error Tolerant
Version of Algorithm 2.1. Our work is based on the following definitions:
Definition 2.7 (ε approximated solution of (Pαx ))
Given ε, α > 0 and x ∈ D a point y∗ ∈ Rn it is called ε approximated solution of (Pαx )
if satisfies
i) y∗ ∈ P (x) and
ii) fα(x, y
∗)− ε ≤ fα(x, να(x)) ≡ ψα(x).
Definition 2.8 (Λεα(x))
Given α > 0, we define the point to set map Λα : int R+ × Rn → Rm+ as a point to set
map satisfying the following properties:
a) given ε > 0 and x ∈ P (x), Λεα(x) is bounded,
b) for any positive sequence {εk} and xk ∈ D satisfying εk → 0 and xk → x∗ and for
any sequence {λk} such that λk ∈ Λεkαk(xk) there exists a subsequence induced by
S ⊂ N such that
lim
k∈S
λk ∈ Λα(x∗),
where Λα(x) ⊂ Rm+ is the set of Lagrange multipliers vectors corresponding to the
nonlinear constraints for the problem (Pαx ).
Notice that differentely from Algorithm 1.3, now we need both approximated primal
(Definition 2.7) and dual solutions (2.8).
In addition, consider the following definition.
Definition 2.9 (Γ%α)
Given α, % > 0, we define the function Γ%α : Rn × Rn → R as
Γ%α(x, ν) = −fα(x, ν) +
1
%
‖c(x)+‖
Notice that from this definition it follows that Ψ%α(x) = Γ
%
α(x, να(x)) for any x.
In the remaining part of this chapter we give the algorithm pseudocode and we prove
its correctness, afterwards in the next Chapter we propose some methods to compute
suitable approximated primal and dual solutions of (Pαx ) for a given error parameter ε.
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Algorithm 2.2: Error Tolerant Algorithm Nonlinear Constraints
0 . Choose x0 ∈ D , and p o s i t i v e sequences {aj}, {j}, {ρj}, {δj}
converg ing to zero such that
∑∞
j=1 δj < +∞ and j < δj .
Set a l l indexes I%, Iα, Iε to 0 and k = 0 .
1 . I n c r e a s e Iε .
2 . Compute ν , Iε approximated s o l u t i o n o f (PaIαxk ) and λ , a
vec to r in Λ
Iε
aIα (xk) .
3 . I f Γ
ρI%
aIα (xk, ν) < 0 (¬C1) or
−η(ΓρI%aIα (xk, ν) + Iε) < −Γ
ρI%
aIα (xk, ν)− aIα [h(xk, ν) + 〈∇xh(xk, ν), ν − xk〉] (¬C2)
i n c r e a s e Ia and Iρ and GOTO Step 1 .
4 . I f 1ρI%
≤ ‖λ+‖ (¬C3) i n c r e a s e IρI% and GOTO Step 1 .
5 . Set dk = ν − xk .
6 . Set k = k + 1 and αk = aIα , %k = ρI% , εk = Iε .
7 . I f dk−1 = 0 s e t xk = xk−1 , tk−1 = 0 and GOTO Step 1 .
8 . Find s m a l l e s t s ∈ N such that
Γ%kαk(xk−1 + γsdk−1, νs)− Γ%kαk(xk−1, ν) ≤ −βγ2s‖dk−1‖+ δk−1
where νs i s an εk approximated s o l u t i o n o f (Pαkxk−1+γsdk−1 ) .
9 . Set tk−1 = γs , xk = xk−1 + tk−1dk−1 and GOTO Step 1 .
2.2.1 Algorithm and Proof of Correctness
The pseudocode of Algorithm 2.2 is given in the listing below.
The first Lemma is devoted to prove that the line search at Step 8 eventually terminates.
Lemma 2.6
Given x, d ∈ D, and α, %, ε, δ > 0, γ ∈ (0, 1), let νs ∈ P (x) be an ε approximated
solution of (Pαx+γsd), and ν0 an ε approximated solution of (Pαx ). Suppose that δ > ε,
then there must exist s ∈ N such that
Γ%α(x+ γ
sd, νs)− Γ%α(x, ν0) ≤ −βγ2s‖d‖+ δ (2.4)
Proof. Definition 2.7 guarantees
Γ%α(x, να(x)) ≤ Γ%α(x, ν0) + ε
Γ%α(x+ γ
sd, να(x+ γ
sd)) ≥ Γ%α(x, νs).
Therefore, supposing that (2.4) hold, for any s > 0, we get
Γ%α(x+ γ
sd, να(x+ γ
sd))− Γ%α(x, να(x)) + ε > −βγ2s‖d‖+ δ (2.5)
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Since the generalized Clarke derivative in the direction d: Γ%◦α (x, να(x); d) = Ψ
%◦
α (x; d)
is finite and δ − ε > 0, there must exist s such that δ−εγs ≥ Γ%◦α (x, να(x); d) + 1 holds for
any s > s. Thus (2.5) produces the following contradiction:
lim sup
s→∞
Γ%α(x+ γsd, να(x+ γ
sd))− Γ%α(x, να(x))
γs
≥ lim sup
s→∞
−βγs‖d‖+Γ%◦α (x, να(x); d)+1,
i.e. 0 ≥ 1.
Looking at the proof, we understand why we need to control the entity of the approx-
imation ε. Without any guarantee on the approximation, we cannot set a proper δ to
ensure that this kind of line search terminates. A good reason to use a line search like
this, is that without assuming that the direction is a descent one, it allows us to prove
the next Lemma, which is very important for the correctness of the method.
Lemma 2.7
Let {xk} be a sequences in D, let {δk}, {εk}, {tk} be positive numbers sequences, such
that
∑∞
i=1 δk < ∞ and δk > εk, and let α, % > 0, and let ν+k , ν−k ∈ P (x) be respectively
an εk approximated and an εk+1 approximated solution of (Pαxk). In addition suppose
that the following inequalities:
Γ%α(xk, ν
+
k )− Γ%α(xk−1, ν−k−1) ≤ −βt2k‖dk‖+ δk
Γ%α(xk, ν
−
k ) ≥ 0
hold for all k. Then limk→∞ ‖t2kdk‖ = 0.
Proof. Exploiting the definition of εk approximation, the line search procedure implies
that :
Γ%α(xk, να(xk))− εk − Γ%α(xk−1, να(xk−1)) ≤ −βt2k‖dk‖+ δk,
holds for any k. The above inequality leads to
N∑
k=2
[Γ%α(xk, να(xk))− Γ%α(xk−1, να(xk−1))] ≤
N∑
k=2
−βt2k‖dk‖+
N∑
k=2
(δk + εk),
where N > 2. Thus, multiplying by −1, we obtain
−Γ%α(xN , να(xN )) + Γ%α(x1, να(x1)) +
N∑
k=2
(δk + εk) ≥
N∑
k=2
βt2k‖dk‖.
Since Γ%α(xN , ν
−
N ) ≥ 0, then also Γ%α(xN , να(xN )) ≥ 0. Thus, we obtain that
Γ%α(x1, να(x1)) +
N∑
k=2
(δk + εk) ≥
N∑
k=2
βt2k‖dk‖.
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holds for any N > 2. Thus, since
∑∞
k=1(δk + εk) is convergent, then also
∑∞
k=1 βt
2
k‖dk‖
is. As a consequence the generic series term have to go to 0:
lim
k→∞
‖t2kdk‖ = 0.
Lemma 2.8
Consider positive sequences {αk}, {εk}, {%k}, and sequences {xk}, {νk} in D. Suppose
that the set S ⊂ N induces a subsequence such that
lim
k →∞
k ∈ L ⊂ N
(xk, αk, %k, εk) = (x
∗, 0, 0, 0) and
Γ%kαk(xk, νk) < 0 (¬C1)
or
− η(Γ%kαk(xk, νk) + εk) < −Γ%kαk(xk, νk)− αk[h(xk, νk) + 〈∇xh(xk, νk), νk − xk〉] (¬C2)
holds for any k ∈ S, for some given sequence {νk} of εk approximated solutions of (Pαkxk ).
Then x∗ solves (EP).
Proof. Either condition ¬C1 or condition ¬C2 has to be true an infinite number of
times. Suppose there exists an infinite set L ⊂ S such that
Γ%kαk(xk, νk) < 0
holds for any k ∈ L. where {νk} is a sequence of εk approximated solutions of (Pαkxk ).
Then, by Definition 2.7 we also have that
Γ%kαk(xk, ναk(xk)) < 0 ∀k ∈ L. (2.7)
Since ναk(xk) belongs to a compact set, we can assume without loss of generality that
lim
k →∞
k ∈ L ⊂ N
ναk(xk) = ν
∗. In addition, we notice that taking the limit as k →∞ with k ∈ L
in the following inequalities
f(xk, ναk(xk)) + αkh(xk, ναk(xk)) ≤ f(xk, ν) + αkh(xk, ν) ∀ν ∈ P (xk),
leads to
f(x∗, ν∗) ≤ f(x∗, ν) ∀ν ∈ P (x∗). (2.8)
Notice that we exploited the fact that the point to set map P : Rn → Rn is continuous
and therefore open, that is for any ν ∈ P (x∗) we can devise a sequence of νk ∈ P (xk)
converging to ν.
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As a consequence of (2.8), we have ν∗ ∈ arg min{f(x∗, ν) : ν ∈ P (x∗)} . Notice that x∗
must belong to C, otherwise taking the limit as k →∞ with k ∈ L of (2.7), we obtain
Γ%kαk(xk, ναk(xk)) = −fαk(xk, ναk(xk)) +
‖c+(xk)‖
%k
→ +∞ ≤ 0
since ‖c
+(xk)‖
%k
→ +∞ and fαk(xk, ναk(xk))→ f(x∗, y∗).
Finally, taking the limit as k →∞ with k ∈ L of (2.7), we obtain
−f(x∗, ν∗) ≤ 0
and therefore x∗ solves (EP). This concludes the case in which ¬(C1) is true an infinite
number of times. Now we move to the other case.
Suppose there exists L ⊂ S such that
−η(Γ%kαk(xk, νk) + εk) < −Γ%kαk(xk, νk)− αk[h(xk, νk) + 〈∇xh(xk, νk), νk − xk〉]
holds for any k ∈ L. Rewriting the above inequality we obtain
Γ%kαk(xk, νk) <
− αk[h(xk, νk) + 〈∇xh(xk, νk), νk − xk〉] + ηεk
1− η ∀k ∈ L2.
Because the RHS goes to 0 as k → +∞, we obtain that x∗ solves (EP) just arguing as
in the former case.
Another important consequence of the above Lemma is that if xk doesn’t solve (EP)
eventually, the variable k defined in Algorithm 2.2 will increase. In other words is not
possibile to have an infinite loop of Steps: 1→ 2→ 3→ 1→ 2→ 3... cycling on some
xk that doesn’t solve (EP). In fact, consider the variables aIα , ρI% , Iε and y: each time
the GOTO 1 is taken at Step 3 C1 or C2 is false, in addition, the variables aIα , ρI% , Iε
decrease thus an infinite loop would generate a going to zero sequence and match the
premises of the above Lemma.
Theorem 2.4 (Correctness)
Suppose that f is c-monotone and let x∗ be a cluster point of the sequence {xk} generated
by Algorithm 2.2, then x∗ solves (EP).
Proof. Let S ⊂ N be the set of all indexes k such that the GOTO at Step 3 has been
taken at that k. If |S| = |N|, then exist a subset of N satisfying the assumptions of
Lemma 2.8, and thus, x∗ solves (EP). Instead, if S is finite, we have that %k = % and
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αk = α, and C1, C2, C3 hold from some k onwards. Indeed if k > max{n ∈ S} C1
and C2 hold and the only possibility to update %k is that the condition ¬C3 at Step 4
is true, but this could happen only for a finite number of times. Otherwise, we would
have a subsequence of λk ∈ Λεkα (xk) for some xk → x∗ ∈ D, with εk → 0 such that:
λk → λ∗ ∈ Λα(x∗) ⊂ Rm
1
%k
≤ ‖λ+k ‖
1
%k
→∞,
where the first statement follows directly from Definition 2.8, the second is the viola-
tion of (C3) and the third is due to the going to zero of %k.
Hence we now deal with the case when %k = % and αk = α, and C1, C2, C3 hold
from some k onwards. Then thanks to the line search at Step 8, the assumptions of
Lemma 2.7 are met and so we have that ‖t2kdk‖ → 0. Let L be an infinite subset of N
such that the limit of xk as k →∞ with k ∈ L is x∗.
We distinguish two cases. If ‖dk‖ → 0 for k ∈ L, then we can choose a convergent
subsequence of εk approximated solutions νk → ν for k ∈ L such that dk = νk − xk,
(remember that D is compact). Hence, since εk → 0, then ‖να(xk) − νk‖ → 0 and
therefore ν = να(x
∗) and d∗ = να(x∗) − x∗ equal to zero actually means that x∗ is a
solution of (EP).
Now, suppose that tk → 0. If for some infinite set R ⊆ L we have that tk = 0 we
can reduce again to the case ‖dk‖ → 0 for k ∈ R , hence we can limit ourselves to the
case tk > 0 from k ≥ k onwards for some k ∈ N. By the way the line search at Step 8
is performed, there exist two sequences ν+k , ν
−
k ∈ P (x) being respectively an εk and an
εk+1 approximated solutions of (Pαxk) for which
Γα% (xk−1 +
tkdk
γ
, ν+k )− Γα% (xk−1, ν−k−1) > −β(
tk
γ
)2‖dk‖+ δk,
at every step k > k ∈ N.
Thus, by Definition 2.7 we can affirm
Γα% (xk−1 +
tkdk
γ
, να(xk−1 +
tkdk
γ
))− Γα% (xk−1, να(xk−1)) + εk > −β(
tk
γ
)2‖dk‖+ δk
holds for any k > k. The mean value theorem guarantees the existence of θk ∈ (0, 1)
such that
Γα% (xk−1 +
tkdk
γ
, να(xk−1 +
tkdk
γ
))− Γα% (xk−1, να(xk−1)) = 〈ξk,
tkdk
γ
〉,
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where ξk is a generalized gradient of Γ
α
% (·, να(·)) at xk−1 + θk tkdkγ . Because of the gen-
eralized gradient proprieties, we have
Γα◦% (xk−1 + θk
tkdk
γ
, να(xk−1 + θk
tkdk
γ
); dk) ≥ 〈ξk, dk〉 ∀k > k.
Hence,
Γα◦% (xk−1 + θk
tkdk
γ
, να(xk−1 + θk
tkdk
γ
); dk) > −β tk
γ
‖dk‖+ δk − εk (2.9)
holds for any k ≥ k.
Exploiting the upper semicontinuity of the generalized derivative (see e.g. [Cla87]) taking
the lim sup as k → +∞ with k ∈ L of (2.9) we get
Γα◦% (x
∗, να(x∗); d∗) ≥ 0. (2.10)
Now, there can be two cases based wheter or not x∗ belongs to C.
Suppose that x∗ ∈ C and but it doesn’t solve (EP).
Notice that −Γα◦% (x∗, να(x∗); d∗) ≤ −ηΓα% (x∗, να(x∗)). Indeed C2 guarantees
− Γα% (xk, να(xk))− α[h(xk, να(xk)) + 〈∇xh(xk, να(xk)), να(xk)− xk〉]
≤ −Γα% (xk, ν+k )− α[h(xk, να(xk)) + 〈∇xh(xk, να(xk)), να(xk)− xk〉]
≤ −η(Γα% (xk, ν+k ) + εk)− α[h(xk, να(xk)) + 〈∇xh(xk, να(xk)), να(xk)− xk〉]
+ α[h(xk, ν
+
k ) + 〈∇xh(xk, ν+k ), ν+k − xk〉],
from which, taking the limit as k →∞, k ∈ L, we obtain the following chain of inequal-
ities
− ηΓα% (x∗, να(x∗))
≥ −Γα% (x∗, να(x∗))− α[h(x∗, να(x∗)) + 〈∇xh(x∗, να(x∗)), d∗〉]
= −Ψα% (x∗)− α[h(x∗, να(x∗)) + 〈∇xh(x∗, να(x∗)), d∗〉]
≥ Ψα◦% (x∗; d∗) = Γα◦% (x∗, να(x∗); d∗).
(2.11)
Where the last inequality follows from Lemma 2.5 (i). Therefore, if x∗ doesn’t solve
(EP) and x∗ ∈ C,
(2.11) contradicts (2.10), since −ηΓα% (x∗, να(x∗)) = −ϕα(x∗) < 0.
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Suppose that x∗ 6∈ C and it does not solve (EP). Condition C3 guarantees 1% ≥
‖(λ+k )‖+ δ, with λk ∈ Λεkα (xk). Hence, exploiting Definition 2.8 we can take a subse-
quence converging to λ∗ ∈ Λα(x∗), such that 1% ≥ ‖(λ∗)+)‖+δ. Thus, by Lemma 2.5(ii),
Γα◦% (x∗, να(x∗); d∗) < 0, contradicting (2.10).

Chapter 3
On the Computation of the Inner
Problem’s Solutions
Algorithm 2.2 generates a sequence of xk ∈ D, and it needs both some εk approximated
solution yk and some λk ∈ Λεkαk(xk) at each step.
In this chapter, we firstly study how the characteristics of yk and λk are linked to a
perturbation of the well known KKT optimality conditions for (Pαx ). Afterwards we
propose two methods. The first, is derived from the Frank and Wolfe algorithm and it
reduces to a sequence of linear programs, interestingly, theoretical results show that it
could be arranged to converge rapidly in our framework. The second is derived from
the Fiacco and McCormick’s Barrier Method and it reduces to a single unconstrained
nonlinear minimization problem.
All the considerations of this chapter are applicable with not much effort to the simpler
case of Algorithm 1.3. Please notice that for the aims of this chapter, we can consider
xk = x ∈ D, εk = ε > 0 and αk = α > 0 fixed.
3.1 A Subset of Approximated Dual Solutions
In this section we study the point to set map Uε, which associates to a point x ∈ Rn
a subset of ε approximated dual solutions. Uε and the function L
∗ defined below, are
common tool which are exploited in literature (e.g. [Hog73a]) to study the asymptotic
behaviour of properties of approximated dual/primal solutions as the approximation
goes to zero. In our case they constitute the main tool to prove that a dual feasible
vector λ ∈ Rm belongs to the set Λεα(x).
In order to express compactly the feasible region of (Pαx ) and abstract from its real
structure we introduce the functions gi.
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Definition 3.1 (gi)
We define the functions gi : Rn × Rn → R for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m as follows:
gi(x, y) = ci(x) + 〈∇ci(x), y − x〉.
Where the functions ci are the ones defined in Assumption 2.1.
We can now express the polyhedron P (x) as follows:
P (x) = {y ∈ D : gi(x, y) ≤ 0}.
Notice that in this way, with a mere substitution gi(x, y) = ci(x) we can cover also the
case of the algorithm Algorithm 1.3.
Definition 3.2 (L∗)
We define the function L∗ : Rn+m → R as:
L∗(x, u) = max
y∈D
− fα(x, y)−
m∑
i=1
uigi(x, y)
The function (y, λ) 7→ fα(x, y)+
∑m
i=1 uigi(x, y) is a partial Lagrangian of (Pαx ). Indeed,
it considers only the inequality-constraints that depends upon the considered x.
Remark 3.1. Let (λ∗, µ∗) ∈ Rm+r be the Lagrangian multipliers for the problem
max
y∈P (x)
− fα(x, y).
Then L∗(x, λ∗) = ψα(x).
Proof. Under Assumption 2.1, strong duality holds for the problem
max
y∈D
− fα(x, y)−
m∑
i=1
uigi(x, y).
Hence, we have that
L∗(x, λ∗)
= max
y∈D
− fα(x, y)−
m∑
i=1
λ∗i gi(x, y)
= min
µ∈Rr1+
{max
y∈Rn
−fα(x, y)−
m∑
i=1
λ∗i gi(x, y)−
r1∑
j=1
µjhj(y) : hj(y) = 0, j = r1, . . . , r}
(3.1)
Where in the last equation we have exploited the hj from the definition of D (see
Assumption 2.1).
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On the other hand, strong duality holds also for the problem
max
y∈P (x)
− fα(x, y),
and we get
ψα(x) = min
(µ,λ)∈Rm+r1+
{max
y∈Rn
−fα(x, y)−
m∑
i=1
λigi(x, y)−
r1∑
j=1
µjhj(y) : hj(y) = 0, j = r1, . . . , r}
=− fα(x, y)−
m∑
i=1
λ∗i gi(x, y)−
r1∑
j=1
µ∗jhj(y).
Since the minimum is attained at (λ∗, µ∗), µ∗ has to minimize the RHS of (3.1).
This remark will be exploited in the proof of Lemma 3.4.
Lemma 3.1
(i) L∗ is a continuous function over Rn+m.
(ii) L∗(x, ·) is convex for any x ∈ Rn.
Proof.
(i) The point to set map x 7→ D is constant, and therefore continuous (see [Hog73c]).
In addition x 7→ D is uniformly compact thanks to Assumption 2.1. The func-
tion −fα(x, ·) −
∑m
i=1 uigi(x, ·) is continuous, thus Theorem A.1 guarantee the
continuity of L∗.
(ii) Let λ ∈ [0, 1] and u1, u2 ∈ Rm+ then
L∗(x, λu1 + (1− λ)u2)
= max
y∈D
−fα(x, y)−
m∑
i=1
(λu1 + (1− λ)u2)gi(x, y)
= max
y∈D
−λfα(x, y)−
m∑
i=1
λu1gi(x, y)− (1− λ)fα(x, y)−
m∑
i=1
(1− λ)u2gi(x, y)
≤ max
y∈D
−λfα(x, y)−
m∑
i=1
λu1gi(x, y) + max
y∈D
−(1− λ)fα(x, y)−
m∑
i=1
(1− λ)u2gi(x, y)
= λL∗(x, u1) + (1− λ)L∗(x, u2)
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Definition 3.3
For any ε ≥ 0, we define the point to set map Uε : Rn → Rm as follows:
Uε(x) = {u ∈ Rm+ |L∗(x, u) ≤ ψα(x) + ε}
Notice that the above definition allows ε to be zero. By definition the set U0(x) is the
set of Lagrangian multipliers of the problem (Pαx ). The following lemma, will be heavily
exploited in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Lemma 3.2 ([Hog73b])
If ψα(x) is finite, then the point set map U0 : Rn → Rm is non empty and uniformly
compact near x, and U0 is closed at x.
Now we will prove that uniformly compactness is achieved also in the case ε > 0.
Lemma 3.3
Given any ε ≥ 0, Uε is a closed point to set map.
Proof. Just apply Theorem A.3 with P (x) ≡ Uε(x), Y ≡ Rm+ and g(x, u) ≡ L∗(x, u).
Lemma 3.4
Given any ε > 0, Uε is an open point to set map.
Proof. We invoke Theorem A.4 with P (x) ≡ {y ∈ Y | g(x, y) ≤ 0} for any x ∈ Rn,
Y ≡ Rm+ and g(x, u) ≡ L∗(x, u) − ψα(x) − ε, which actually means P (x) = Uε(x). In
order to apply Theorem A.4, we have to prove that g is continuous on x× P (x), that
g(x, ·) is convex (both ensured by Lemma 3.1) and that for each fixed x ∈ Rn, there
exists u ∈ Y such that g(x, u) < 0. This could be seen, observing that fixed x ∈ Rn,
there exists u ∈ Rm+ : L∗(x, u)−ψα(x)− ε < 0. Indeed Remark 3.1 shows that for any
x we can choose the optimal Lagrangian multiplier u∗ and obtain L∗(x, u∗) = ψα(x).
Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4 guarantee the continuity of the point to set map Uε.
Corollary 3.1
For any ε > 0 the point to set map Uε is continuous.
Lemma 3.5
Let ε > 0 and suppose that Uε(x) is non empty. Then, the point to set map Uε : Rn →
Rm is non empty and uniformly compact near x.
Proof. Let f : R2n → R be a constant function, let Ω(x) ≡ Uε(x), v(x) ≡ supy∈Ω(x) f (x, y)
and M(x) ≡ {y ∈ Ω(x)|v(x) ≤ f (x, y)}. Since f is constant, M(x) = Ω(x).
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Moreover f is continuous and quasiconcave and, Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.3, guarantee
that Ω is closed on a neighborhood of x and open at x.
Furthermore, M(x) = Uε(x) is bounded: otherwise, there would exist uk ∈ Uε(x) such
that ‖uk‖ → +∞, so, there could exist an index i∗ ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} such that uki∗ → +∞.
Let y ∈ D satisfy gi(x, y) < 0 for any i (the existence of such a vector y is ensured by
Assumption 2.1), then we would have
L∗(x, uk) = max
y∈D
−fα(x, y)−
m∑
i=1
ukigi(x, y) ≥ −fα(x, y)−
m∑
i=1
ukigi(x, y),
Therefore, since −ukigi(x, y) → zi ∈ R+ ∪ {+∞} for any i, we would have that
L∗(x, uk) → +∞. Obviously L∗(x, uk) ≤ ψα(x) + ε since uk ∈ Uε(x), and thus the
finiteness of ψα(x) would led to a contradiction.
Hence, all the assumptions of Theorem A.5 are met and the thesis follows.
Our aim is to prove that Uε(x) ⊆ Λεα(x). We already showed that Uε(x) is bounded. The
following lemma shows that we can extract a converging subsequence, then exploiting
Lemma 3.1, we will prove the desired inclusion.
Theorem 3.1
Let {xk} and {εk} be two sequences such that εk > 0, εk → 0 and xk → x∗ for some x∗
at which ψα(x
∗) finite, then ∪k>0Uεk(xk) is bounded.
Proof. By contradiction, we prove that the existence of a sequence {uk} such that uk ∈
∪k>0Uεk(xk) and ‖uk‖ → +∞ is not possible.
By Lemma 3.5, Uεk(xk) is bounded for any k. Thus, in order to prove that ‖uk‖ → +∞
is impossible, we can just consider the case uk ∈ Uεk(xk).
Suppose there exists a sequence {uk} such that uk ∈ Uεk(xk) and ‖uk‖ → +∞. Thanks
to Lemma 3.2, we can construct a sequence zk ∈ U0(xk), such that zk → z∗ ∈ U0(x∗).
Moreover, given an abitrarily large M > 0, we can construct also a sequence {wk}
satisfying the following conditions:
(a) wk = λkzk + (1− λk)uk,
(b) λk ∈ [0, 1],
(c) wk converges to some w
∗ such that M < ‖w∗‖ < +∞.
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If M < ‖z∗‖, it is enought to set λk = 1 to satisfy (a), (b) and (c). Hence, suppose
M > ‖z∗‖, and choose λk = 1− δ‖uk‖ with δ > 0. We have
‖wk‖2 = λ2k‖zk‖2 + (1− λk)2‖uk‖2 + 2λk(1− λk)zTk uk
= (1− δ‖uk‖)
2‖zk‖2 + δ2 + 2δ(1− δ‖uk‖)z
T
k (
uk
‖uk‖)
≤ (1− δ‖uk‖)
2‖zk‖2 + δ2 + 2δ(1− δ‖uk‖)‖zk‖,
(3.2)
where we have exploited the well known Cauchy–Schwarz inequality. As a consequence,
taking the limit in (3.2) as k → +∞, we obtain that ‖w∗‖ < +∞. Furthermore, it holds
‖wk‖2 ≥ (1− δ‖uk‖)
2‖zk‖2 + δ2,
In fact, since Uε(x) ⊂ Rm+ for any ε ≥ 0 and any x ∈ Rn we have 2λk(1− λk)zTk uk ≥ 0.
Now, taking the limit as k → +∞ in the above inequality, we obtain
‖w∗‖ ≥ ‖z∗‖2 + δ2.
Since ‖uk‖ → ∞, we can set δ =
√
M and subsequencing to fulfil the requirement
0 ≤ λk ≤ 1. Hence, we can assume to have sequence a {wk} that satisfies (a), (b) and
(c).
By Lemma 3.1, we have that L∗(xk, ·) is convex. Therefore, it holds
L∗(xk, wk) ≤ λkL∗(xk, zk) + (1− λk)L∗(xk, uk) ≤ λkψα(xk) + (1− λk)(ψα(xk) + εk),
where the last inequality follows from zk ∈ U0(xk) and uk ∈ Uεk(xk). Moreover,
we proved that L∗ and ψα are continuous functions. Thus, taking the limit we get
L∗(x∗, w∗) ≤ ψα(x∗), and hence w∗ ∈ U0(x∗). Anyway, by construction we can make
‖w∗‖ arbitrarily big contradicting the boundedness of U0(x∗), which is guaranteed by
Lemma 3.2.
We are finally ready to state the following corollary:
Corollary 3.2
Uε(x) ⊆ Λεα(x).
Proof. Lemma 3.5 guarantees that Definition 2.7 a) holds. Consider a sequence λk ∈
Uεk(xk) with xk → x∗ ∈ D and εk → 0. Theorem 3.1 guarantees that we can construct
a converging subsequence λkj → λ∗. Furthermore since L∗ is continuous, we obtain that
λ∗ ∈ U0(x∗), i.e., λ∗ is a Lagrangian multiplier of (Pαx ). Hence, also Definition 2.7 b)
holds.
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3.2 Relaxating the Complementary Slackness Conditions
In this section we study a weaker case of KKT conditions (named εKKT(η) conditions),
obtained relaxating the complementary slackness conditions. Afterwards, we prove that
vectors which satisfy them provide suitable ε approximated solution y and λ ∈ Λεα(x).
Definition 3.4 (εKKT(η))
Given η ∈ int Rm+ , and ε > 0 we say that a vector (y, λ, µ) ∈ Rn+m+r satisfies the
εKKTx(η) conditions if
∇yfα(x, y) +
m∑
i=1
λi∇ygi(x, y) +
r∑
j=1
µj∇hj(y) = 0 (εKKTx(η)1)
m∑
i=1
λigi(x, y) ≥ −ε (εKKTx(η)2)
µjhj(y) = 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , r1 (εKKTx(η)3)
gi(x, y) ≤ −ηi i = 1, 2, . . . ,m (εKKTx(η)4)
y ∈ D (εKKTx(η)5)
λ ∈ Rm+ , µ ∈ Rr1+ × Rr−r1 (εKKTx(η)6)
The following Lemma shows that the εKKTx(η) conditions are sufficient for y to be an
ε approximated solution of (Pαx ).
Lemma 3.6
If (y, λ, µ) ∈ Rn+m+r satisfies the εKKTx(η) conditions, then y is an ε approximated
solution of (Pαx ).
Proof. Let y∗ be a solution of (Pαx ). By (εKKTx(η)4) and (εKKTx(η)5), y ∈ P (x) and
therefore fα(x, y
∗) ≤ fα(x, y). Thus, it is enough to prove that fα(x, y∗) + ε ≥ fα(x, y).
Exploiting the convexity of gi(x, ·), hj and (εKKTx(η)1), we obtain
0 = 〈∇yfα(x, y) +
m∑
i=1
λi∇ygi(x, y) +
r∑
i=1
µi∇hi(y), y∗ − y〉
≤ fα(x, y∗)− fα(x, y) +
m∑
i=1
λi(gi(x, y
∗)− gi(x, y)) +
r∑
j=1
µj(hj(y
∗)− hj(y)).
Since y∗ ∈ P (x) and λ ∈ Rm+ , λigi(x, y∗) ≤ 0 for any i. Moreover, it holds
r∑
j=1
µj(hj(y
∗)− hj(y)) =
r1∑
j=1
µj(hj(y
∗)− hj(y))
≤
r1∑
j=1
µj(−hj(y)) = 0.
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Where the first equality holds since y, y∗ ∈ D, the inequality holds since µj ≥ 0 and
y∗ ∈ D and the last equality follows from (εKKTx(η)3). Therefore, we obtain
0 ≤ fα(x, y∗)− fα(x, y) +
m∑
i=1
λi(gi(x, y
∗)− gi(x, y)) +
r∑
j=1
µj(hj(y
∗)− hj(y))
≤ fα(x, y∗)− fα(x, y)−
m∑
i=1
λigi(x, y).
Where we implicitly exploit that λ ∈ Rm+ , y∗ ∈ P (x) implies λigi(x, y∗) ≤ 0. Finally
applying (εKKTx(η)2) to the last inequality, we conclude that
0 ≤ fα(x, y∗)− fα(x, y)−
m∑
i=1
λigi(x, y) ≤ fα(x, y∗)− fα(x, y) + ε.
The remaining part of this section is devoted to prove that if (y, λ, µ) ∈ Rn+m+r satisfies
the εKKTx(η) conditions, then λ ∈ Uε(x) (and thus λ ∈ Λεα(x)).
Proposition 3.1
Let x ∈ Rn and ε > 0 be given. If (y, λ, µ) ∈ Rn+m+r satisfies εKKTx(η), then
λ ∈ Uε(x).
Proof. Given x ∈ Rn, by definition it is required that L∗(x, λ) ≤ ψα(x) + ε for λ to
belong to Uε(x).
Consider the problem
min
y∈D
fα(x, y) +
m∑
i=1
λigi(x, y). (P(λ))
The convexity of fα(x, ·) +
∑m
i=1 λigi(x, ·), guarantees that the KKT are sufficient to be
a minimizer. KKT conditions for (P(λ)) are indeed satisfied by (y, λ, µ), since they are
exactly (εKKTx(η)1), (εKKTx(η)3), (εKKTx(η)5) and (εKKTx(η)6). Therefore, y is a
solution of (P(λ)) and we have
−L∗(x, λ) = min
y∈D
fα(x, y) +
m∑
i=1
λigi(x, y)
= fα(x, y) +
m∑
i=1
λigi(x, y)
≥ −ψα(x) +
m∑
i=1
λigi(x, y)
≥ −ψα(x)− ε.
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Where the first inequality follows from Lemma 3.6 and the second from (εKKTx(η)2).
3.3 Existence of Solutions
In this section we show that at least one vector satisfying conditions εKKTx(η) for a
given ε always exists.
Definition 3.5
Let η ∈ Rm+ . We define the point-to-set map P : Rn × Rm → Rn as
P (x, η) = {y ∈ D| gi(x, y) + ηi ≤ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m}.
Definition 3.6
Let η ∈ Rm+ . We define the problem (P ηx ) as
(P ηx ) find y ∈ arg min
y∈P (x,η)
fα(x, y)
Under Assumption 2.1, the continuity of the functions involved in our problem guar-
antees the existence of η ∈ int Rm+ such that whenever η ∈ Rm+ satisfies η 5 η compo-
nentwise there exists y ∈ Rn such that gi(x, y) + ηi < 0 and hj(y) < 0 hold for any
x ∈ Rn and i = 1, 2, . . .m, j = 1, 2, . . . , r1. Therefore, the set
V ≡ {η ∈ Rm+ | ∃y ∈ Rn∀x ∈ Rn : gi(x, y)+ηi < 0, hj(y) < 0, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , r1, },
includes an open ball centered at 0. If we restrict to those η ∈ V only, we can assume
that the Slater’s constraint-qualification holds and that the solutions of (P ηx ) satisfy the
KKT conditions. Namely, these conditions read:
∇yfα(x, y) +
m∑
i=1
λi∇ygi(x, y) +
r∑
i=1
µi∇hi(y) = 0 (KKTηx 1)
λigi(x, y) = −λiηi i = 1, 2, . . . ,m (KKTηx 2)
µihi(y) = 0 i = 1, 2, . . . , r1 (KKT
η
x 3)
gi(x, y) ≤ −ηi i = 1, 2, . . . ,m (KKTηx 4)
y ∈ D (KKTηx 5)
λ ∈ Rm+ , µ ∈ Rr1+ × Rr−r1 (KKTηx 6)
Notice that for any η ∈ V , (P ηx ) admits a solution since the feasible region is non empty
and compact and fα(x, ·) is continuous. Furthermore, the solution is unique since fα(x, ·)
is strictly convex.
56 Chapter 3 On the Computation of the Inner Problem’s Solutions
Thanks to the convexity assumptions, also strong duality holds.
Now, we are going to show some proprieties of the optimal multipliers for (P ηx ). It is
straightforward to see that
U(x, η) ≡ {u ∈ Rm+ | L(x, η, u) = max
u=0
L(x, η, u)},
where
L(x, η, u) ≡ inf
y∈D
fα(x, y) +
m∑
i=1
ui(gi(x, y) + ηi),
is the set of Lagrange multipliers for (P ηx ) corresponding to the constraints gi.
Lemma 3.7
For any (x, η) ∈ Rn × V , the point-to-set map U : Rn+m → R is non empty, uniformly
bounded near (x, η) and closed at (x, η).
Proof. Notice that
i) min
y∈P (x,η)
fα(x, y) exists and it is finite thanks to the Weierstrass’s theorem (since
fα(x, ·) is continuous and P (x, y) is compact).
ii) fα(x, ·) is convex and continuous and so are also the functions (y, η) 7→ gi(x, y) + η,
iii) Slater’s constraint qualification holds for any x ∈ Rn and η ∈ V ,
iv) the solution set M(x, η) = arg min
y∈P (x,η)
fα(x, y) is a subset of D and therefore is bounded
thanks to Assumption 2.1.
Then, the thesis follow directly from Theorem A.6 considering f = −fα and Ω = P ,
X = Rn × V , Y = Rm.
Existence of an εKKTx(η) vector
Obviously, the existence of a vector (y, λ, µ) ∈ Rn+m+r satisfing KKTηx conditions, im-
plies the existence of an εKKTx(η) vector with ε =
∑m
i=1 λiηi. Intuitively, this leads us
to think that for any ε > 0, there exists η ∈ int Rm+ such that the system of Defini-
tion 3.4 admits at least one solution.
Theorem 3.2
Let ε > 0, then exist η ∈ int Rm+ such that for any η ∈
∏m
i=1[0, ηi] exists a vector
(y, λ, µ) ∈ Rn+m+r satisfying the εKKTx(η) conditions.
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Proof. Given ε > 0 we construct a sequence such that ηk ∈ V , ηk → 0 with λk ∈ U(x, ηk).
Thanks to Lemma 3.7, we can take a subsequence of λk converging to λ
∗. Therefore,∑m
i=1 λkiηki → 0. Thus, there exists an index k such that
∑m
i=1 λkiηki ≤ ε since ε > 0.
This guarantees that εKKTηkx admits a solution.
3.4 Practical Methods to Compute Approximated Primal/-
Dual Solutions
A possible way to compute an ε approximated solution is to solve directly the equations
coming out from εKKTx(η) conditions. Unluckily, as for the KKT conditions, this could
be difficult or inefficient in some cases. Therefore, we develop a very general method
based on the Frank-Wolfe algorithm.
3.4.1 Frank & Wolfe Method Review
The Frank-Wolfe method [FW56] is a well known method to solve constrained optimiza-
tion problems. When applied to the problem (Pαx ), it generates two sequence of points
of P (x): zk and yk:
zk ∈ arg min
z∈P (x)
fα(x, yk−1) + 〈∇yfα(x, yk−1), z − yk−1〉
yk = (1− αk−1)yk−1 + αk−1zk−1,
(3.5)
where {αk} is a sequence in [0, 1] such that αk → 0 and y0 ∈ P (x).
Proposition 3.2
Define εk = fα(x, yk) − fα(x, yk−1) − 〈∇yfα(x, yk−1), zk − yk−1〉 then yk is an εk ap-
proximated solution of (Pαx )for any k > 0.
Proof. The sequence of points yj , j ∈ N produced by the Frank and Wolfe algorithm
belongs to the set P (x). Thus, the only property to be checked is that
fα(x, να(x)) ≥ fα(x, yk)− εk.
Exploiting the convexity of fα(x, ·) we have that
fα(x, να(x)) ≥ fα(x, yk−1)+〈∇yfα(x, yk−1), να(x)−yk−1〉 ≥ fα(x, yk−1)+〈∇yfα(x, yk−1), zk−yk−1〉,
where the last inequality is due to the optimality of zk. The definition of ε allows writing
the above inequality as
fα(x, yk)− εk = fα(x, yk−1) + 〈∇yfα(x, yk−1), zk − yk−1〉 ≤ fα(x, y(x)). (3.6)
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Frank and Wolfe [FW56] proved that if fα(x, ·) is convex and D is compact yk → να(x) as
k →∞. This implies that the error εk → 0. Thanks to the above proposition, breaking
the Frank-Wolfe procedure when εk ≤ ε, yk provides the desired ε approximated solution.
3.4.1.1 How to Obtain Bounded Approximated Dual Solutions
A possible way to obtain elements of Λεα(x) is to gather them from the solution of the
problem
min
z∈P (x)
fα(x, yk−1) + 〈∇yfα(x, yk−1), z − yk−1〉
that is solved at every iteration of the Frank-Wolfe procedure. In particular we can use
as approximated dual solution the solution of the problem
λx ∈ arg max
λ∈Rm+
min
z∈D
〈∇yfα(x, ykˆ−1) + fα(x, ykˆ−1), z − ykˆ−1〉+
m∑
i=1
λigi(x, z) (3.7)
where ykˆ satisfies
ε ≥ εkˆ = fα(x, ykˆ)− fα(x, ykˆ−1)− 〈∇yfα(x, ykˆ−1), zkˆ − ykˆ−1〉. (3.8)
For clarity, suppose that our algorithm calls the routine below (see Algorithm 3.1) at
each iteration with parameters xk and εk in input to obtain the approximated primal
and dual solution of Pαxk .
Algorithm 3.1: Truncated Frank & Wolfe
TruncatedFrankAndWolfe (x , ε)
Choose y0 ∈ P (x) , s e t i = 0 .
do
Compute (zi, λi) , pr imal and dual s o l u t i o n o f the problem
minz∈P (x) fα(x, yi) + 〈∇yfα(x, yi), z − yi〉 .
αi =
2
i+2
yi+1 = (1− αi)yi + αizi
e r r o r = fα(x, yi+1)− fα(x, yi)− 〈∇yfα(x, yi), zi − yi〉
i = i+1
whi le ( e r r o r > ε)
re turn (yi, λi−1)
Multipliers obtained in this way enjoy the fundamental propriety of belonging to the set
Uε(x) given in Definition 3.3 as stated by the following Lemma.
Theorem 3.3
Suppose that λ ∈ Rm+ satisfies (3.7), then λ ∈ Uε(x).
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Proof. Consider the function L∗ given in Definition 3.2. Exploiting the convexity of
fα(x, ·), we obtain
L∗(x, λ) = max
z∈D
−fα(x, z)−
m∑
i=1
λigi(x, z)
≤ max
z∈D
−fα(x, ykˆ−1)− 〈∇yfα(x, ykˆ−1), z − ykˆ−1〉 −
m∑
i=1
λigi(x, z)
= −fα(x, ykˆ−1)− 〈∇yfα(x, ykˆ−1), zkˆ − ykˆ−1〉.
Thanks to (3.8) we get
fα(x, ykˆ−1)+〈∇yfα(x, ykˆ−1), z−ykˆ−1〉 = f(x, ykˆ)−εkˆ ≥ miny∈P (x) fα(x, y)−εkˆ = −ψα(x)−εkˆ.
Multiplying the above inequality by -1, we get
L∗(x, λ) ≤ ψα(x) + εkˆ ≤ ψα(x) + ε,
which is the characteristic property of the vector λ belonging to Uε(x).
This result, coupled with Theorem 3.1, ensures that the procedure described in Al-
gorithm 3.1 is suitable to be embedded in algorithm Algorithm 2.2.
3.4.1.2 On the Computational Cost
The Truncated Frank-Wolfe algorithm explained in the above section has the advantage
of involving only the solution of linear optimization programs. In fact, thanks to the
linearization technique introduced in the previous chapter, all the constraints functions
in (Pαx ) are linear. Moreover, the Frank and Wolfe algorithm solves an optimization
program with a linear objective function at each step.
On the other hand, the well known drawback of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm is its “slow”
convergence rate. Indeed we have fα(x, yk)−fα(x, yα(x)) ≤ O( 1k ) ([FW56] and [DH78]).
Anyway in a recent paper ([JLJ14]) Simon Lacoste-Julien and Martin Jaggi showed that
the Frank-Wolfe variant with Away Steps converges with a geometric rate (O(%−k)) for
any strongly convex objective function if furthermore the feasible region is a polytope.
This is indeed our case: the strong convexity requirement is always met due to the
properties of h, as well as the geometric properties of the feasible region.
The Away Steps variant was proposed in [Wol70]. While in the standard Frank-Wolfe
algorithm the direction at each iteration k is given by the vertex zk, the Away Steps
variant allows us to exploit also a subset of the vertices which have already been consid-
ered in the previous iterations. To do so, a data structure containing a subset of those
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vertices {zi|i ≤ k} is mantained. At each iteration k a new vertex could be added or
there could be a “drop step”, which causes the deletion of one or more vertices. After
computing the standard Frank-Wolfe direction zk − yk, the algorithm chooses the best
descent direction available in the data structure, i.e. z1 − yk, is better than z2 − yk if
〈∇yfα(x, yk), z1〉 ≤ 〈∇yfα(x, yk), z2〉.
It is easy to check that the Away Steps variant enjoys the same good properties of
the standard Frank-Wolfe algorithm and therefore we can use a Truncated Away Steps
Algorithm correctly.
Summarizing, exploiting a Frank and Wolfe method (in its Away Steps variant) and
truncating it when the error gets under our treshold ε, we get an ε approximated solution
of (Pαx ) and one vector λ ∈ Λεα(x). In addition, the algorithm has a good theoretical
behaviour due to its geometric rate of convergence and to the fact that the iteration cost
could be ammortized exploiting linear programming solvers.
3.4.2 Unconstrained Minimization Method
We introduced Algorithm 3.1 mainly because of its linearization property. Although
its theoretical “good behaviour” practical performances could be very different.
Beyond the Frank-Wolfe approach, another possibility that could lead to good perfor-
mances is the Uncostrained Minimization Method.
Given t > 0, consider the problem
min{fα(x, y)− 1
t
m∑
i=1
log(−gi(x, y)) : y ∈ D, gi(x, y) < 0 i = 1, 2, . . . ,m}. (CP(t))
Since G ≡ {y ∈ Rn| gi(x, y) < 0 i = 1, 2, . . . ,m} is an open convex set, if y ∈ G ∩ D
solves (CP(t)), either
∇y[fα(x, y)− 1
t
m∑
i=1
log(−gi(x, y))] = 0,
or y is a boundary point of G ∩D. Optimization algorithms can benefit from this fact.
As an example, in the case when D = Rn, (CP(t)) can be solved as an unconstrained
optimization problem searching for y ∈ Rn satisfying
∇y[fα(x, y)− 1
t
m∑
i=1
log(−gi(x, y))] = 0.
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Enhanced techniques are possible also in the case when D is given by linear equalities
and in general when it is a polyhedron strengthening the hypothesis accordingly.
The solution of (CP(t)) is linked to the εKKT(η) conditions by the following theorem.
Lemma 3.8
If y∗ solves (CP(t)), then there exist λ ∈ Rm+ , µ ∈ Rr1+ × Rr−r1 and η ∈ int Rm+ such
that (y∗, λ, µ) satisfies the εKKT(η) conditions with ε = mt .
Proof. Since −log(−(·)) is a convex increasing function, its composition with gi(x, ·)
preserves the convexity. Since the Slater’s constraint qualification holds, the KKT con-
ditions for (CP(t)) have to be satisfied by some µ ∈ Rr1+ × Rr−r1 :
∇yfα(x, y∗) +
m∑
i=1
∇ygi(x, y∗)
−tgi(x, y∗) +
r∑
j=1
µj∇hj(y∗) = 0 (3.9a)
µjhj(y
∗) = 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , r1 (3.9b)
y∗ ∈ G ∩D. (3.9c)
Defining λi =
1
−tgi(x,y∗) for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, we are done. In fact (εKKTx(η)1), (εKKTx(η)3),
(εKKTx(η)5) are satisfied respectively because of (3.9a), (3.9b) and (3.9c). In addition
we have that λigi(x, y) =
1
−t and therefore also (εKKTx(η)2) is satisfied since
m∑
i=1
λigi(x, y) = −m
t
. (3.10)
Finally, y∗ ∈ G guarantees (εKKTx(η)6) and the existence of η ∈ int Rm+ such that
(εKKTx(η)4) holds.
It is straightforward that due to this lemma, we can provide suitable ε approximated
solutions solving a single problem in the form of (CP(t)) with t = m/ε, taking advantage
of the lack of constraints.
3.4.2.1 Historical Notes
The name comes from the fact that it reduces a constrained problem in the form of (Pαx )
to unconstrained optimization problems, except for the linear constraints which define
D (see Assumption 2.1). Moreover, in turn they could be partially absorbed into the
objective function obtaining
min
Hy=0
fα(x, y)− 1
t
m∑
i=1
log(−gi(x, y))− 1
t
r1∑
j=1
log(−hj(y)),
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where H ∈ Rn×r−r1 .
Usually, the Unconstrained Minimization Method, is not used as it is to solve exactly
an optimization problem through a unique unconstrained problem. Indeed it is used to
solve a sequence of problems in the form (CP(t)) for increasing values of t, exploiting
every time the previous solution point as the starting point. Since the solutions of
(CP (tk)) are
m
tk
approximated solutions of (Pαx ), for tk → ∞ the method converges to
an optimal solution. The mtk approximated solutions are internal points of the feasible
region: for this reason the sequence of points solution of (CP (tk)) is called central-
path. This kind of methods, was originally proposed by Fiacco and McCormick in the
1960s. These methods are also called Barrier Methods or Sequential Unconstrained
Minimization Technique (SUMT) and belong to the family of Interior Point Methods.
Chapter 4
Equilibrium Prices Forecasting in
Cloud Computing
In this chapter we describe a concrete equilibrium problem which can be formulated in
the (EP) format, and we apply the methods proposed in the previous chapters aiming at
solving it. The first section describes the domain of the application (Cloud Computing).
In the second section we give a description of the problem from a Game Theoretic point
of view. In the third section we briefly discuss the assumptions and the application of
the descent methods. In the last section we show some numerical results.
4.1 Domain Presentation
A Cloud Computing Application
According to Armbrust at al. [AFG+10] “cloud computing refers to both the applications
delivered as services over the Internet and the hardware and systems software in the data
centers that provide those services”. Therefore, cloud computing involves computational
resources being sold on demand (utility computing) as a service. These computational
resources can belong to different levels of abstraction from software (software as a service
or SaaS) to hardware (platform or infrastructure as a service or PaaS/IaaS).
The impact of cloud computing in modern economy is huge. Selling computational
resources on demand allows converting capital expenses to operating expenses (CapEx
to OpEx) and cut down the over/under provisioning problem. For these reasons currently
the cloud computing offer is becoming day by day wider.
As cloud-based services increase and become more dynamic, new challenges and prob-
lems for the management of the provider systems arise. As a result Game Theory have
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been used extensively to model the competitive behaviour of the service providers and
users, see for example Shue et al. [SFS13] and Ardagna et al. [APP11].
In this chapter we consider the point of view of an IaaS provider which sells virtual
machines and communication bandwidth to the users. The users act as if their virtual
machines were real computing platforms with memory and computational capacity. On
the other side, the provider assigns each virtual machine to a physical server which
runs a virtualization software emulating the behaviour of the virtual machines. The
virtual machines belonging to the same user can send and receive messages, which in
turn are transmitted between the physical machines over the provider’s network. In
our scenario the provider has already allocated the virtual machines of his tenants and
has a stochastic knowledge of the communication bandwidth intensity that the users
will buy as a function of the transmission price. The objective of the provider is to
choose proper network routing and transmission prices in order to achieve an efficient
allocation and high revenues. On the other hand, the users are interested in accessing
the best communication bandwidth at the most convenient price. The system is modeled
as a game and the algorithms developed in the previous chapters are applied to find an
equilibrium.
System Model
We can model the server network as a graph G = (N,A), whose nodes are the physical
machines. We assume to have |N | = m physical machines denoted as PMi for i =
1, . . . ,m. T is the number of tenants, VM(i) is the set of virtual machines bought by
tenant i. The generic virtual machine is denoted as VMj .
Each virtual machine has been allocated on one physical machine and has associated
a parameter µj that represents its computational capacity. We can think of µj as the
mean number of data that the virtual machine can can process in the unit of time.
For each pair of communicating virtual machines VMs, V Mr ∈ VM(i), λsr denotes the
transmission bandwidth bought for communication from VMs to VMr. We can think
of λsr as the maximum number of data that VMs can send to VMr in the unit of time.
K is the number of communicating machine pairs and Λ(i) is the set of communication
pairs associated to tenant i.
The arc (i, j) ∈ A has associated a capacity, denoted as xkij , that is reserved for the
transmission of data of the pair k. The total capacity of the arc (i, j) is denoted by uij .
The unitary price paid for the transmission k is denoted by ck. In addition, we denote
the cost for routing a unit of flow through the arc (i, j) by bij .
We have the following quantities:
• ∑(i,j)∈A∑Kk=1 bijxkij , the total routing cost in the server network.
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• ∑k λkck, the income of the provider.
• ∑k xkij , the total reserved capacity of the arc (i, j).
• uij −
∑
k x
k
ij , the free capacity of the arc (i, j).
4.2 Game Theoretic Formulation
We model the behaviour of the tenants and the service provider as a game. The service
provider’s strategy concerns the allocation of the flows in the network (xkij) in order to
satisfy the demands of the tenants and the transmission prices (ck). A tenant’s strategy,
instead, concerns the deciding of the transmission demand (λk) between his virtual
machines. Since we assume the virtual machines to be already assigned to the physical
machines, each λk has associated an origin-destination pair of physical machines.
Provider’s Best Response
Formally, given vector of transmission demands λ ∈ RK , the response of the service
provider is
min
∑
(i,j)∈A
K∑
k=1
bijx
k
ij −
∑
k
rkλkck∑
j∈BS(i)
xkji −
∑
j∈FS(i)
xkij = β
k
i i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K
K∑
k=1
xkji ≤ uij (i, j) ∈ A
K∑
k=1
ck
K
≤ B
xkij ≥ 0 (i, j) ∈ A, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K
0 ≤ ck ≤ c k = 1, 2, . . . ,K
(PR)
where
βki =

−λk if i is the origin of flow k
λk if i is the destination of flow k
0 otherwise
,
BS(i) and FS(i) denote respectively the backward and forward star of node i and rk
is a positive constant that can be used to model particular server’s policies (e.g, QoS
classes).
The first set of constraints provides a correct allocation of the flows λk in the network,
in order to satisfy the demands. The subsequent capacity constraints guarantee that
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the arc capacity uij is not exceeded. The first term of the objective function requires
the routing to be of minimum cost with respect to the prices bij . Notice that the
set of constraints relative to the variables xkij requires the solution of an embedded
multicommodity minimum cost flow problem in which K is the number of commodities.
The provider prices are constrained to be lower or equal to c and the mean price
∑K
k=1
ck
K
cannot exceed the fixed positive constant B.
Tenant’s Best Response
The response of each tenant depends only on the prices. This is because he does not
have knowledge of the network. The purpose of the tenant is to minimize his expenses.
In addition, in order to guarantee a good communication between his virtual machines,
the tenant tries to maximize the minimum bandwidth. Formally, given the provider
strategy c ∈ RK , the response of the tenant i is given by
min
∑
k∈Λ(i)
λkck − λmin∑
k∈S(j)∩Λ(i)
λk ≤ µj j ∈ VM(i)
λk ≥ λmin k ∈ Λ(i)
W k ≤ λk ≤W k k ∈ Λ(i)
(TR)
where S(j) denotes the set of pairs that have the virtual machine VMj as destination.
λmin is an auxiliary variable: due to the constraints λk ≥ λmin, the best value it can get
whenever λk’s are given is always the value of the minimum λk ∈ Λ(i). The constraint∑
k∈S(j)∩Λ(i) λk ≤ µj requires that the intensity of data transmitted in the time unit to
machine VMi does not exceed the quantity of data it can compute. W k,W k ∈ R+ are
lower and upper bound on the bandwidth allocation to the tenant.
4.2.1 Enhanced Formulation
Bounding Network Delay
The game formulated above would be perfect to test ?? and ??, aiming at finding
equilibria. Anyway, we need nonlinear constraints in order to test properly algorithm
Algorithm 2.1 and Algorithm 2.2,. Therefore, we decided to modify the provider
response (PR) adding a constraints on the maximum delay to cross arcs in the network.
The delay function we consider is the one introduced by the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads
[oPR64], defined as
Dij(x) = fij [1 + 0.15(
∑
k x
k
ij
uij
)4],
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where fij is the free flow travel time on link (i, j) per unit of time. Dij extimates the
mean time required to cross the arc (i, j) when the utilization factor of the arc is equal
to
∑
k x
k
ij
uij
. The provider best response, we call it (PRE) (Provider Response Enhanced),
becomes
min
∑
(i,j)∈A
K∑
k=1
bijx
k
ij −
∑
k
rkλkck∑
j∈BS(i)
xkji −
∑
j∈FS(i)
xkij = β
k
i i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K
K∑
k=1
xkji ≤ uij (i, j) ∈ A
Dij(x) ≤ Dij (i, j) ∈ A
K∑
k=1
ck
K
≤ B
xkij ≥ 0 (i, j) ∈ A, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K
0 ≤ ck ≤ c k = 1, 2, . . . ,K
(PRE)
where Dij is a positive constant bounding the delay for crossing arc (i, j).
Software Application Scenario
All the descent methods we have described in the previous chapters implicitely require
a centralized execution. In fact, all the players’ parameters have to be accessible to
the algorithm. This could be in contrast with some enviromental policies, as in cloud
computing, where for security reasons is often preferred a distributed approach.
Our proposal is to apply the algorithms at the server side, with simulation purposes.
Instead of computing equilibria that require all players’ informations, the provider esti-
mates the parameters of the users (e.g., from past sessions) and solve (EP). The aim is
to provide the server with a stochastic knowledge of the equilibria.
In our case, all the parameters W k,W k and µj are private informations of the tenant
and hence are not known to the provider. Therefore, we suppose that the provider treats
them as random variables with known distribution. Instead of requiring λk, to satisfy
the constraints  λk ≤W kλk ≥W k, (4.1)
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it is required that the probability that the random variables W k and W k satisfy the
constraints is greater than  ∈]0, 1[: P{λk ≤W k} ≥ P{λk ≥W k} ≥ . (4.2)
In the same way, introducing the random variable µj , we substitute the constraints∑
k∈S(j)∩Λ(i)
λk ≤ µj j ∈ VM(i) (4.3)
with
P{
∑
k∈S(j)∩Λ(i)
λk ≤ µj} ≥  j ∈ VM(i). (4.4)
Optimization programs that include this kind of constraints are also known as chance
(or probabilistic) constrained programs. Chance constrained programming have been
introduced by Charnes and Cooper [CC59] in a linear programming framework.
Due to the simple structure of the constraints (4.1), the constraints (4.2) can be handled
easily.
Definition 4.1
Let FX be the cumulative distribution function of a random variable X : Ω→ R where
(Ω,F ,P) is a probability space. Then given  ∈ (0, 1], the  quantile of X is defined as
qX = arg inf{x ∈ R | FX(x) ≥ }.
Since the cumulative distribution function FX is continuous and monotone non decreas-
ing, if FX is invertible with inverse F
−1
X , we have qX = F
−1
X (). Furthermore it holds
that if x ≤ qX then FX(x) ≤ .
Exploiting the quantile we can replace the constraints (4.2), which can be nonlinear, by
simple box constraint as shown by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1
λk ∈ R satisfies (4.2) iff
qWk ≤ λk ≤ q1−Wk .
Proof. Let FWk and FWk be the cumulative distribution function of W k and W k respec-
tively. The first constraint of (4.2) rewrites
1− P{λk ≥W k} ≥ 
1− FWk(λk) ≥ 
FWk(λk) ≤ 1− .
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Definition 4.1 guarantees that the above condition is satisfied by λk iff λk ≤ q1−Wk .
Similarly the second constraint of (4.2) is equivalent to FWk(λk) ≥ . This condition is
satisfied iff λk ≥ qWk .
Repeating the same reasoning with constraints (4.4) we obtain the equivalent theorem:
Theorem 4.2
λk ∈ R satisfies (4.4) iff ∑
k∈S(j)∩Λ(i)
λk ≤ q1− µj .
The best response of the tenant i becomes
min
∑
k∈Λ(i)
λkck − λmin∑
k∈S(j)∩Λ(i)
λk ≤ q1− µj j ∈ VM(i)
λk ≥ λmin k ∈ Λ(i)
qWk ≤ λk ≤ q1−Wk k ∈ Λ(i).
(TRE)
Notice that in (TRE) all the parameters are known to the provider. Indeed q1− µj , qWk , q1−Wk
could be statistically extimated by the observations collected during previous sessions
with the user i.
In what follows we will refer to the game given by (PRE) and (TRE) as the prices
forecasting game and to the problem of finding an equilibrium as the equilibrium prices
forecasting problem (EPFP).
4.3 From Theory to Application
4.3.1 Generalized Games
There is a very relevant difference between the game definition given in Definition 1.2
and the game presented in the previous section. Indeed, looking at (PRE) we can notice
that the strategy set of the provider depends on the variables of the other players. This
is due to the constraints∑
j∈BS(i)
xkji −
∑
j∈FS(i)
xkij = β
k
i i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K,
since βki depends on λk. This is in contrast with Definition 1.2, since it requires that
the strategy set of each player is independent of the others player’s variables.
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In this section we introduce the notion of Generalized Game and of Generalized Nash
Equilibrium Problem (Debreu [Deb52]), which is a more general class of problems that
cover our case. As we will see, due to the particular structure of the game, the GNEP
can be found exploiting a Nikaido-Isoda bifunction as before: thus, we can apply the
theory developed in the past chapters.
Definition 4.2 (Generalized Game)
A generalized game G is a triple G = 〈P, {Sp}p∈P , {up}p∈P 〉 where
− P = {1, 2, . . . , N} is the set of players,
− Sp is a point to set map Sp : Rn−p → Rnp ,
− up :
∏N
j=1 Sj → R is the payoff function of player p.
Clearly, the difference with Definition 1.2 lays in Sp. While in Definition 1.2 Sp is a
set meaning that the player p can always play any strategy sp ∈ Sp, in Definition 4.2
Sp is a point to set map with the meaning that the strategy played by p depends on the
strategies s−p choosen by the other players:
sp ∈ Sp(s−p).
Hence, the best response of player p to the other players’ strategy s−p ∈
∏
i 6=pRni is
min{up(sp, s−p) | sp ∈ Sp(s−p)}.
The Generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) consist in finding strategies (s1, s2, . . . , sN )
which are a Generalized Nash equilibrium, defined as follows.
Definition 4.3 (Generalized Nash Equilibrium)
Let G be a game and let
S = {x ∈
N∏
p=1
Rnp | xp ∈ Sp(x−p) p = 1, 2, . . . , N}.
A point x∗ ∈ S is called Generalized Nash Equilibrium for the game G iff
up(y, x
∗
−p) ≥ up(x∗) ∀(y, x∗−p) ∈ S
holds for any player p.
The Jointly Convex situation (Rosen [Ros65]) provides an interesting case.
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Assumption 4.1 (Convexity Assumption)
A (GNEP) is said to satisfy the Convexity Assumption if for every player p and every
x−p ∈
∏
i 6=p Im Si, the payoff function up(·, x−p) is convex and the set Sp(x−p) is closed
and convex.
Definition 4.4 (Jointly Convex)
Consider a GNEP satisfying the Convexity Assumption. We say that it is jointly convex
if there exists some closed convex set X ∈∏Ni=1Rni such that we have that
Sp(x−p) = {xp ∈ Rnp | (xp, x−p) ∈ X} ∀x−p ∈
∏
i 6=p
Rni
holds for any player p.
It is remarkable that if the sets Sp(x−p) are given by inequalites in the form
Sp(x−p) = {xp ∈ Rnp | gp(xp) ≤ 0, g(xp, x−p) ≤ 0}
for some g :
∏N
i=1Rni → Rm, gp : Rnp → Rmp , and , m,m1, . . . ,mP ≥ 1 then a GNEP
satisfying the Convexity Assumption is jointly convex iif g, g1, . . . , gP are convex over
their respective domain.
The interesting thing about jointly convex (GNEP)s it that can be reformulated as an
(EP) exploiting the Nikaido Isoda bifunction (1.4). In fact if NI is the Nikaido Isoda
bifunction and X is the convex set of strategies as in Definition 4.4, then solving the
(GNEP) is equivalent to solve the following (EP):
find x ∈ X : NI(x, y) ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ X.
For further details on (GNEP) the reader can refer to the detailed survey by Facchinei
and Kanzow [FK07].
4.3.2 Application of the Descent Methods
We introduced the Equilibrium Prices Forecasting problem in order to have a concrete
setting to test the algorithms described in the previous chapters. In this paragraph we
show that the (GNEP) associated with the EPFP problem matches all our assumptions.
Joint Convexity
Firstly, notice that the (GNEP) is jointly convex. Indeed, both the provider and the
tenants’ payoff functions (see (PRE) and (TRE)) are affine with respect to their opti-
mization variables. In addition, all the constraints in (PRE) and (TRE) are given by
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inequalities or equalities and are convex with respect to all the variables. Hence, the
corresponding (GNEP) satisfies the Convexity Assumption and is jointly convex.
Assumptions on the Nikaido Isoda Bifunction
The Nikaido Isoda bifunction NI : RK|A|+K+K × RK|A|+K+K → R associated with
(EPFP) is
NI(X,Y ) = fprov(Yx, Xλ, Yc)−fprov(Xx, Xλ, Xc)+
T∑
t=1
f tten(Xx, Yλ, Xc)−f tten(Xx, Xλ, Xc)
where fprov is the payoff function of the provider, i.e.,
fprov(x, λ, c) =
∑
(i,j)∈A
K∑
k=1
bijx
k
ij −
∑
k
rkλkck,
and f tten → R is the payoff function of the tenant t, i.e.,
f tten(x, λ, c) =
∑
k∈Λ(t)
λkck − λtmin
and Xx ∈ RK|A|, Xλ ∈ RK , Xc ∈ RK are the components of the vector X related
respectively to the variables xkij , λk and ck (Yx ∈ RK|A|, Yλ ∈ RK , Yc ∈ RK are defined
accordingly).
NI is composed by affine functions. Obviously, it is differentiable and NI(X, ·) is convex
for any X ∈ RK|A|+K+K . In addition, it can be proven (see [BP14]), that c-monotonicity
is guaranteed if NI(·, Y ) is concave for any Y ∈ RK|A|+K+K . This is indeed the case,
since NI(·, Y ) is affine.
4.4 Numerical Results
The platform we decide to adopt is MATLAB R2011a. We implement the following
algorithms:
BCP: Algorithm 1.2,
BCP-ET: Algorithm 1.3,
COAP: Algorithm 2.1,
COAP-ET: Algorithm 2.2.
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The implementation includes an OO framework for optimization problems, a random
generator of instances of (EPFP) and MATLAB coding of several nonlinear optimization
algorithms.
In order to test properly the algorithms, we decided to solve their inner problems (Pαx )
and (Pαx ) using the same procedure: the Sequential Unconstrained Minimization Tech-
nique described in subsection 3.4.2. We have seen that the SUMT solves a sequence of
problems in the form (CP(tk)) with tk → +∞. In our implementation tk = 10 · 20k and
the central path problem (CP(tk)) is solved via the MATLAB function fmincon exploing
the Successive Quadratic Programming method. COAP and BCP require an optimal
solution, so the choice 10−6 represent the threshold for “true optimality”. Instead, BCP-
ET and COAP-ET stop the computation whenever an ε approximated solution is found.
This obvioulsy impacts on the number of average iterations of the SUMT method and
therefore on the average computational time.
After some preliminary tests we set parameters of the algorithm as follows:
Parameter Value
η 0.8
β 0.7
γ 0.9
Sequence Value
αk
1
k2
%k
1
k5
k
1
k2
δk
25
k2
Firstly we tested the algorithm on 10 instances of (EPFP) generated fully at random for
fixed number of tenant (10) and network nodes (8). The table below reports the average
size of the subprobem (Pαx ).
Dimension
Variables 352
Nonlinear Constraints 33
Linear Inequalities 41
Linear Equalities 80
The computation is ended when h(xk, yα(xk)) < 10
−2. The mean of the results is shown
in the following table.
Algorithm Time Sub-Problems Sub-Problem Time Jumps
BCP 219s 20 8.14s 14
COAP 211s 20 8.03s 14
BCP-ET 144s 20 4.6s 15
COAP-ET 138s 20 4.49s 16
where
Time is the average completion time of the algorithm (in seconds),
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Sub-Problems is the number of times a problem in the form (Pαx ) and (Pαx ) is solved,
Sub-Problem Time is the average time required for solving these problems,
Jumps is the mean number of GOTO taken due to a dissatisfaction of a condition.
Remember that a GOTO is taken every time the parameter α or % are updated.
While the general behaviour of the algorithm does not change (number of jumps and
of sub-problem solved), we can notice a sensible decrement in the completion time that
almost halves. This is due to the reduction of the average time required to solve the inner
problems. Notice that the time to solve (Pαx ) and (Pαx ) is nearly the same. This is due
to the SUMT method: indeed, all the inequality constraints are taken into the objective
function during the computation and the nonlinear constraints influence minimally only
the evaluation of the objective function and of its gradient.
In order to approximate the asymptotic behaviour of the algorithms we plan an “in-
cremental size” test. We generate 6 instances of (EPFP) of different sizes, maintaining
constant the ratio between number of nodes and number of flows. The following graph
relates the number of variables to the completion time of the algorithms.
BCP
COAP
BCP-ET
COAP-ET
0 100 200 300 400 500
Variables0
100
200
300
400
500
Time Hsec.L
It can be noticed that we have an encouraging speed up in both error tolerant versions
also for different problem sizes.
The error tolerant versions perform as well as the tolerance threshold for h(x, yα(x)) is
high. The number of iterations increases when lowering the threshold and consequently
the average time required to find a sub-optimal solution of the inner problem increases.
The following table helps to understand the decay of the error tolerant benefits as the
threshold decreases.
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It has been generated solving an instance of (EPFP) of 8 nodes and 10 flows via BCP and
BCP-ET. We have taken the average time needed to solve the inner problem at every
iteration, considering the iterations that achieve almost the same value h(x, yα(x)). We
can do this since the behaviour of the two algorithms is very similar. Anyway, we can
always enforce this behaviour choosing proper sequence {εk}. Hence the ratio of the
average inner problem solution time for the different iterations is an estimator of the
potential speed up for different threshold.
Notice that since the behaviour of COAP/COAP-ET is comparable with the one of
BCP/BCP-ET due to the SUMT algorithm, we have consired only BCP and BCP-ET
in this test.
Iteration Avg IPT BCP Avg IPT BCP-ET Ratio
1 7.71s 3.30s 2.33
2 7.34s 4.38s 1.67
3 7.44s 4.48s 1.66
4 7.58s 4.48s 1.69
5 7.73s 4.54s 1.70
6 8.81s 6.07s 1.45
7 9.15s 6.48s 1.48
8 9.19s 6.46s 1.42
9 9.04s 7.55s 1.19
10 9.09s 7.64s 1.18
11 8.87s 7.62s 1.16
where
Iteration is the number of iterations,
Avg IPT BCP is average time required by BCP for solving the inner problem,
Avg IPT BCPET is average time required by BCPET for solving the inner problem,
Ratio is the ratio Avg IPT BCPAvg IPT BCPET .
In the following graph shows how the Ratio changes as a function of the number of
iterations
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As expected, the improvement provided by the error tolerant approach vanish as the
number of iterations increases.
Summarizing, numerical results suggest to apply the error tolerant extensions when it
is required a mid-low accurancy (h(x, yα(x)) threshold) of the solutions of (EP) or in
general when the number of iterations is not too high. But this is rather intuitive,
indeed, since the speed up provided by the error tolerant approach lasts for a finite
number of iterations it is useless to apply BCP-ET or COAP-ET when (EP) requires a
high number of iterations. On the other hand, under this above conditions, numerical
results show that the performace can improve moderately.
Appendix A
Point-to-Set Maps in
Mathematical Programming
The following paragraph briefly reviews some results due to Hogan about the theory of
points-to-set maps, that are used throughout all the thesis.
Definition A.1 ([Hog73c])
Let X and Y be topological spaces. Let Ω be a point-to-set map Ω : X → Y , i.e., a
function Ω : X → 2Y . Then, we define Ω to be:
a) open at a point x ∈ X iff {xk} ⊂ X, xk → x and y ∈ Ω(x) imply the existence of an
integer m and a sequence {yk} ⊂ Y such that yk → y and yk ∈ Ω(xk) for k ≥ m.
b) closed at a point x ∈ X iff {xk} ⊂ X, xk → x, yk ∈ Ω(xk) and yk → y imply
y ∈ Ω(x).
c) continuous at a point x iff is closed and open at x.
Ω is open, closed of continuous on X if it has the corresponding property for every
x ∈ X.
d) Ω is said to be uniformly compact(bounded) near x iff there is a neighbour N of x
such that the set ∪x∈NΩ(x) is, respectively, compact(bounded).
Theorem A.1 ([Hog73c])
Let Ω be a point-to-set map Ω : X → Y , and let f : X × Y → [−∞,+∞] . Consider
the following function v : X → [−∞,+∞]
v(x) = sup
y∈Ω(x)
f (x, y).
If Ω is continuous and uniformely compact at x ∈ X and f is continuous on x× Ω(x),
then v is continuous at x.
77
78 Appendix A Point-to-Set Maps in Mathematical Programming
Theorem A.2 (Danskin [Dan67] [Hog73b])
Let Ω, f , v,X, Y be defined as in Theorem A.1. Suppose that ∇xf exists, f and ∇yf
are continuous over X × Y , X is compact, and Ω is constant. Then, the directional
derivative v′(x; d) exists for any x, d ∈ X and
v′(x; d) = max
y∈M(x)
〈∇xf (x, y), d〉
where M(x) = {y ∈ Ω(x)| v(x) ≤ f (x, y)}.
Theorem A.3 ([Hog73c])
Let P be a point-to-set map P : X → Y defined as follows:
P (x) = {y ∈ Y : g(x, y) ≤ 0},
where g(x, y) : X × Y → [−∞,+∞]m. If each component of g is lower semicontinuous
on x× Y , then P is closed at x.
Theorem A.4 ([Hog73c])
Let P be a point-to-set map and g a function defined as in Theorem A.3. If Y is
convex and normed, if each component of g is continuous on x × P (x) and g(x, ·) is
convex for each fixed x ∈ X, and if there exists y ∈ Y such that g(x, y) < 0, then P is
open at x.
Theorem A.5 ([Hog73c])
Let Ω, f , v,M be as defined in Theorem A.2. Suppose in addition that Y is a subset of
a finite-dimensional normed space, f (x, ·) is quasiconcave in y for fixed x and continuous
on X × Y , Ω is closed on a neighborhood of x and open at x, and Ω(x) is convex for
each x in a neighborhood of x. Then, M(x) is non empty and compact if and only if
M(x) is nonempty and uniformly compact near x.
Theorem A.6 ([Hog73b])
Let Y be a closed convex set, and let the point-to-set maps Ω,M : X → Y and the
function v : X → Y be defined as follows:
Ω(x) = {y ∈ Y | g(x, y) 5 0},
v(x) = sup
y∈Ω(x)
f (x, y),
M(x) = {y ∈ Y | v(x) ≤ f (x, y)},
where g(x, ·) and −f (x, ·) are convex. In addition, let x ∈ X and suppose that g, f are
continuous on Nx×Y , where Nx is a neighborhood of x. Let U(x) be the set of Lagrangian
multipliers associated with the problem which defines v(x). If M(x) is nonempty and
bounded and there is a point y ∈ Y such that g(x, y) < 0, then U and M are nonempty
and bounded on a neighborhood of x and U is closed at x.
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Nonlinear Programming
Convexity
Definition B.1 (Convex Set)
A set C ⊆ Rn it is said to be convex if given any x, y ∈ C
λx+ (1− λ)y ∈ C ∀λ ∈ [0, 1].
Definition B.2 (Convex Function)
Let C be a convex subset of Rn. A function f : Rn → R is called
− convex over C if for any x, y ∈ C
f(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≤ λf(x) + (1− λ)f(y) ∀λ ∈ [0, 1].
− strictly convex over C if for any x, y ∈ C
f(λx+ (1− λ)y) < λf(x) + (1− λ)f(y) ∀λ ∈ [0, 1].
− strongly convex over C if ∃m > 0 such that for any x, y ∈ C
f(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≤ λf(x) + (1− λ)f(y)− 1
2
mλ(1− λ)‖x− y‖22 ∀λ ∈ [0, 1].
A function f such that −f is convex, strictly or strongly convex is called respectively
concave, strictly concave or strongly concave. The following implications are obvious
from the above definitions:
f strongly convex ⇒ f strictly convex ⇒ f convex. (B.1)
Theorem B.1
Let C ⊆ Rn be a convex set. A differentiable function f : Rn → R is
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− convex over a set C iff for any x, y ∈ C
f(x) ≥ f(y) + 〈∇f(y), x− y〉. (B.2)
− strictly convex over a set C iff for any x, y ∈ C
f(x) > f(y) + 〈∇f(y), x− y〉.
− strongly convex over a set C iff ∃m > 0 such that for any x, y ∈ C
f(x) ≥ f(y) + 〈∇f(y), x− y〉+ m
2
‖x− y‖22.
Optimization Problems
Let f be a function Rn → R and D be a subset of Rn, then we define the optimization
problem (OP), denoted as
min
x∈D
f(x), (OP)
as the problem of finding a point x ∈ Rn satisfying
i) x ∈ D,
ii) f(x) ≤ f(y) ∀y ∈ D.
The requirement i) is called feasibility while ii) is called optimality. A solution of (OP)
is also called global minimum of (OP) in order to distinguish it from local minima of
(OP), which are feasible points that satisfy the optimality requirement only in their
neighborhoods.
Definition B.3 (Local Minimum of (OP))
A point x ∈ D is a local minimum of (P) if ∃ε > 0
f(x) ≤ f(y) ∀y ∈ B(x, ε) ∩D, (B.3)
where B(x, ε) denotes the open ball of radius ε centered at x.
Clearly a global minimum is also a local minimum but not viceversa.
Theorem B.2
Suppose that f is convex over D. If x is a local minimum of (OP), then it is also a
global minimum of (OP).
Theorem B.3
Suppose that f is strictly convex over D. Then, if there exists at least one local minimum
of (OP), it is unique.
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Unconstrained Optimization
In this paragraph we deal with the case D = Rn. In this case the problem (OP) is called
Unconstrained Optimization Problem (UOP) and it is denoted as
min
x∈Rn
f(x). (UOP)
Definition B.4 (Stationary Point of (UOP))
Suppose that f is differentiable. Then, a point x is called Stationary Point of (UOP) if
∇f(x) = 0. (B.4)
Theorem B.4 (Fermat (1637))
If x is a local minimum of (UOP), then it is a stationary point of (UOP).
As a consequence of (B.2) and of Theorem B.4 we obtain the following theorem
Theorem B.5
Suppose that f is differentiable and convex over Rn, then x solves (UOP) iff
∇f(x) = 0. (B.5)
The interesting fact is that if f is differentiable and convex, the problem (UOP) collapse
in the problem of solving a system of equations. Therefore, in principle, any algorithm
to solve nonlinear systems (e.g., Newton-Raphson) could be used.
Constrained Optimization
In this paragraph we generalize the above results removing the assumption D = Rn.
The first results concern a convex feasible region D.
Definition B.5
Suppose that D is convex and that f is differentiable over D. Then a point x ∈ D is
called stationary point of (OP) if
〈∇f(x), x− x〉 ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ D. (B.6)
Theorem B.6
Suppose that D is convex and that f is differentiable over D. Then if a point x ∈ D is
a local minimum of (OP) it is a stationary point of (OP).
As a consequence of Theorem B.2, Theorem B.6 and (B.2) we obtain the following
result.
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Theorem B.7
Suppose that D is convex and that f is differentiable and convex over D. Then a point
x ∈ D is a global minimum of (OP) iff is a stationary point of (OP).
More interesting results could be obtained supposing that D is explicitly described by
inequalities. Let functions f, gi, hj : Rn → R be differentiable over Rn for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
and j = 1, 2, . . . , r. In addition, suppose that
D = {x ∈ Rn| gi(x) ≤ 0, hi(x) = 0} (B.7)
Then, the the problem (OP) reads
min f(x)
gi(x) ≤ 0 i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
hj(x) = 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , r
(COP)
and the following theorem holds.
Theorem B.8 (Fritz-John)
If x is a local minimum for (COP) then ∃ θ, λ1, . . . , λm ≥ 0 and µ1, . . . , µr ∈ R such
that
θ∇f(x) +
m∑
i=1
λi∇gi(x) +
r∑
j=1
µjhj(x) = 0
λigi(x) = 0 i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
gi(x) ≤ 0 i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
hj(x) = 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , r
(FJ)
with at least one nonzero element between θ, λ1, . . . , λm, µ1, . . . , µr.
Definition B.6 (Set of Active Constraints)
Given x ∈ Rn, we define the (index) set of active inequality constraints I(x) as
I(x) = {i| gi(x) = 0}.
Definition B.7 (SCQ)
Let x be a point of Rn. If gi is convex and hj is affine for any j and i ∈ I(x), the
vectors ∇hj(x) are linearly independent and there exists y ∈ Rn such that gi(y) < 0
and hj(y) = 0 for any j = 1, . . . , r, i ∈ I(x), then x satisfies the Slater constraint
qualification.
Definition B.8 (MFCQ)
Let x be a point of Rn. If the vectors ∇hj(x) are linearly independent and if there
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exists d ∈ Rn such that
〈∇gi(x), d〉 < 0 i ∈ I(x)
〈∇hj(x), d〉 = 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , r,
then x satisfies the Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint qualification.
Notice that SCQ implies MFCQ.
Theorem B.9 (Karush-Kuhn-Tucker)
Let x be a point satisfying MFCQ constraint qualification. If x is a local minimum for
(COP), then there exist λ1, . . . , λm ≥ 0 and µ1, . . . , µr ∈ R such that
∇f(x) +
m∑
i=1
λi∇gi(x) +
r∑
j=1
µjhj(x) = 0
λigi(x) = 0 i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
gi(x) ≤ 0 i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
hj(x) = 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , r
(KKT)
The above optimality necessary conditions are also called KKT conditions and they are
a particular case of Theorem B.8. For the sake of brevity, we reported only MFCQ and
SCQ but there are other assumptions on x, called constraint qualifications, that allows
us to move from Fritz-John conditions to the KKT conditions.
While in general KKT conditions are only necessary conditions to be a global minimum,
in the particular case when f, gi are convex for i = 1, . . . ,m and hj are affine for j =
1, . . . , r, they are also sufficient. The λi satisfying (KKT) are called Lagrange multipliers.
Duality
Definition B.9 (Lagrangian)
We define the Lagrangian function of (COP), L : Rn × Rm × Rr → R as
L(x, λ, µ) = f(x) +
m∑
i=1
λigi(x) +
r∑
j=1
µjhj(x).
Notice that the first KKT condition
∇f(x) +
m∑
i=1
λi∇gi(x) +
r∑
j=1
µjhj(x) = 0 (B.8)
could be also written ∇xL(x, λ, µ) = 0, with the immediate interpretation that a local
minimum has to be a stationary point of the function L(·, λ, µ).
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Definition B.10 (Lagrange Dual Function)
We define the function g : Rm+ × Rr → R as the optimum value of the unconstrained
minimization problem of minimizing L(·, λ, µ) over Rn, i.e.
g(λ, µ) = inf
x∈Rn
L(x, λ, µ).
Theorem B.10
Given λ ∈ Rm+ and µ ∈ Rr, let x∗ be the solution of (COP). Then, it holds
g(λ, µ) ≤ f(x∗).
Definition B.11
We define the Lagrange dual problem as the constrained optimization problem given by
max{g(λ, µ) : λ ∈ Rm+ , µ ∈ Rr}. (LD)
Theorem B.11 (Strong Duality)
Suppose that f, gi are convex and hj are affine for any i, j. If x
∗ solves (COP) and
satisfies SCQ and, in addition (λ∗, µ∗) solves (LD), then
g(λ∗, µ∗) = L(x∗, λ∗, µ∗) = f(x∗).
and the vector (x∗, λ∗, µ∗) the satisfies KKT conditions.
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